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Introduction
Competition plays a central role in the functioning of markets, as it promotes
innovation, productivity, and growth. To maintain efficient competition and to
prevent anticompetitive behavior, authorities, like the European Commission, es-
tablished competition laws. The European Commission is continuously working
on improving its antitrust and merger regulations, so that all firms in EU markets
compete equally and fairly. Two aspects covered by these regulations, particularly
relevant for this thesis, are related to the R&D agreements between competing
firms and to the horizontal partial acquisitions.
In 2010, the European Commission issued ”block exemptions” regulations
which provide an automatic exemption from competition law for certain types
of R&D agreements. The reason is that the cooperation between competitors
to jointly undertake and exploit R&D may promote technological and economic
progress. Hence, collaborations between competitors on the investment level should
be treated differently to anticompetitive agreements, like cartels or market-sharing,
which are prohibited by Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU
(TFEU).
When it comes to horizontal partial acquisitions, the European Commission is
seeking to extend its power to review the acquisitions of non-controlling minor-
ity shareholdings. Its concern is that such partial acquisitions, especially those
among competitors, may substantially lessen competition and escape scrutiny. In
its ”White Paper: Towards more effective EU merger control”, the European Com-
mission proposed particular changes to the EC Merger Regulation with respect to
partial acquisitions.
Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis aim to evaluate some aspects of the afore-
mentioned changes and proposals of modifications to the EU competition laws,
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whereas Chapter 3 addresses much broader scope of problems. Specifically, Chap-
ter 1 studies potential anticompetitive effects of partial acquisitions among com-
petitors. Chapter 2 analyses collaborations between competitors on an investment
level. Chapter 3 focuses on the information transmission in the presence of infor-
mation asymmetries. Given that Chapter 1 considers a situation where the outside
firm may not be able to observe whether the acquiring firm can influence decisions
of the target firm, the asymmetric information is crucial for both Chapter 1 and
Chapter 3. The chapters are described in more detail below.
Chapter 1 studies anticompetitive issues that arise from partial acquisition be-
tween competitors. Under current EC Merger Regulation (ECMR), the European
Commission has authority to inspect partial acquisitions in which acquiring firm
attains control over target firm’s decisions. The European Commission argues
that non-controlling shareholdings between competitors can as well give signifi-
cant influence to the acquirer and that this influence could be difficult to assess
in practice. Hence, the parties that do not participate in the acquisition, such as
outside firms, may not be able to observe it.
We consider a situation in which an acquiring firm can influence a target firm’s
strategic decisions with some probability. The results suggest that no matter
whether this influence is observable by an outside firm or not, the partial acquisi-
tion can create a greater harm to competition than a merger when the acquisition
share and the probability of decisive influence are high. However, when the influ-
ence is not observable, all firms in the market suffer reduction of profits, provided
that the prices are lower. As a consequence, this leads to a higher social welfare.
Chapter 2 is based on joint work with Juliane Fudickar (Fudickar and Rakic´
(2016)) and it analyzes cooperation between competitors at the investment level.
Several studies1 show that supporting firms to collaborate in R&D with spillovers
boosts R&D investment and consequently increases the social welfare. Those stud-
ies considered a symmetric setup. However, new market environments, in which
established goods are in competition with innovative goods, may lead to asym-
metries between firms. Therefore, we consider R&D investment with spillovers
in a market where a multi-product firm competes with a single-product firm. In
this environment we analyze whether investment incentives are higher under R&D
1See, among others, D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992).
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cooperation or competition to evaluate the effect of the new ”block exemptions”
regulation by the European Commission.
We show that this depends on the technology spillover and also on the degree of
product differentiation. Namely, when the established and the innovative products
are close substitutes, total R&D investment under cooperation will be lower than
under competition even if the spillover is substantial. More specifically, R&D
investment of the single-product firm may be higher under competition than under
cooperation even if the spillover is large. Moreover, for medium spillovers and
high product substitutability the multi-product firm also invests less under R&D
cooperation.
Chapter 3 is based on joint work with Martin Pollrich and it focuses on strategic
information transmission between an informed expert and an uninformed decision
maker. Examples of such communication abound: before implementing a policy,
politicians consult their advisors; or before deciding on an investment strategy,
investors consult stockbrokers. Such interactions are often accompanied by a con-
flict of interest. As a consequence, the expert may have the incentive to mislead
the information. Previous literature shows that, due to the conflict of interest, the
full revelation of information is impossible.2 However, when the preferences of the
sender and the receiver are not too far apart, some information transmission can
occur. Additionally, communication via a mediator3 (interested or disinterested)
can improve upon direct talk. In this chapter, we address the question as to what
extent these results rely on the availability of the mediator. Therefore, we study
the robustness of strategic communication between an informed expert and an
uninformed principal via a mediator.
We assume that with some probability the mediator is not available for com-
munication. In this case the expert is forced to talk directly to the principal. We
show that when the probability of absence is not too large, there exists an equi-
librium of this perturbed game, that is outcome equivalent to the one with the
mediator.
2See, for example, Crawford and Sobel (1982).
3See Myerson (1986), Forges (1986), Goltsman et al. (2009), and Ivanov (2010a) among others.
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Chapter 1
Horizontal partial acquisition
with unobservable control
1.1 Introduction
When buying shares in a target firm, an acquiring firm obtains cash-flow rights
whereby it incorporates profit of the target firm in proportion to the acquisition
share. In addition to this financial interest, the acquiring firm may also obtain
corporate rights so that it can control the strategic decisions of the target firm.
A non-controlling partial acquisition is called a ”structural link”, whereas a par-
tial acquisition where control is specifically granted to the acquirer is called a
”concentration”. While the European Commission has a jurisdiction to inspect
concentrations, there is an ongoing debate whether structural links, at least those
between competitors, should also belong to the scope of EC Merger Regulation
(ECMR)1. One of the arguments is that partial acquisitions that do not qual-
ify for concentration can still give significant influence to the acquirer and, more
specifically, that this influence could be difficult to assess in practice. Hence, the
parties that do not participate in the acquisition (e. g. outside firms and antitrust
authorities) may not be able to observe it.
Such acquisitions among competitors are widespread in many different markets
1In 2014, the European Commission has issued a ”White Paper: Towards more effective EU
merger control” where it proposed to broaden the scope of the EU Merger Regulation so it can
also review the structural links between rivals.
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and are seen even among historic rivals. Some examples include: the Irish low-cost
airline Ryanair owns 29,8% of shares in its competitor Aer Lingus, Microsoft holds
7% of shares in its rival Apple Inc. and the biggest US producer of wet shaving
razors, Gillette, owns 22,9% of shares in Wilkinson Sword.
To the best of our knowledge, the underlying assumption in the existing liter-
ature on the effects of the partial acquisition on competition is that the outside
firms can observe the organizational structure between the firms involved in the
acquisition. The goal of this chapter is to investigate the effects of partial acquisi-
tions on competition and on the choice of an optimal acquisition share when the
outside firm lacks such information. To address this question, we consider a differ-
entiated market with three firms: an acquiring firm, a target firm and an outside
firm. The acquiring firm owns a share in the target firm, whereas the outside firm
neither owns shares in its competitors, nor is owned by either of them. Due to the
difficulty to assess the level of influence of the acquiring firm on the target firm’s
strategic decisions, we assume that with some probability, the acquiring firm has
control over the target firm and with the remaining probability it only has a fi-
nancial interest. The firms involved in the acquisition know whether the acquirer
controls the target or not, while the outside firm only observes the probability of
decisive influence.
As a benchmark, we first analyze the case when the outside firm can observe
whether the acquirer has corporate control over the target or not. We show that
in this case, the partial acquisition can create greater harm to the competition
than a total merger. Additionally, when the probability of total control is high
and when the goods are not too close substitutes, the optimal acquisition share
is smaller than 100%, i.e. total merger does not maximize the joint profit of the
acquirer and the target. The reason is that the acquirer, when owning less than
100% of the target and having a total control over the target, sets the price of
the target firm higher than the price of its own product, also higher than under
merger, so that the demand for its own product increases. Given that the prices
are strategic complements, an increase in the price of the target firm leads the
outside firm to increase its price as well. Thus, partial acquisition in the case of
total control serves as a strategic device to relax competition.
The situation is different when the outside firm cannot observe the partial
6
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ownership arrangement between the firms taking part in the acquisition. In the
case of total control, the acquiring firm cannot signal the outside firm that it
would keep the price of the target firm high. As a result, the outside firm sets its
price lower than in the case of complete information. The lack of transparency
in the market, therefore, creates a reduction of profits to the firms, but it also
lowers the anticompetitive concerns. Despite this positive welfare effect due to
the asymmetric information, partial acquisition can still create greater harm to
competition than the full merger. Additionally, when the probability of decisive
influence and the product differentiation are high, the preferred acquisition share
is again smaller than 100%.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 revises the
related literature. The theoretical model is presented in Section 1.3. In Section
1.4 we analyze the benchmark case of complete information. In Section 1.5 we
assume that the outside firm cannot observe whether the acquiring firm controls
the decisions of the acquired firm or not and compute the optimal prices and
acquisition share. Section 1.6 derives the welfare implications and Section 1.7
concludes. The proofs of all formal results are relegated to the Appendix.
1.2 Related literature
The importance of separation between the financial interest and corporate con-
trol in the context of horizontal partial acquisition is pointed out by Bresnahan
and Salop (1986) and Salop and O’Brien (2000). They conduct a comprehensive
analysis of different types of partial acquisitions in regard to the influence of the
acquiring firm on the target firm’s decisions. Bresnahan and Salop (1986) develop
a Modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and Salop and O’Brien (2000) a Price
Pressure Index to quantify anticompetitive effects arising from partial ownership.
Missing from their studies is a formal analysis of presented acquisition scenarios
on the competition.
Foros et al. (2011) study the effects of the partial acquisition on the product
market outcomes and the optimal acquisition share, by assuming that the acquiring
firm has the corporate control over the target firm. They use a Salop model with
three firms and differentiated products. They, as we do, find that the partial
7
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ownership can lead to higher joint profits than the full merger. We extend their
model by introducing a more general demand function. Moreover, we consider the
anticompetitive effects of non-observability of the acquiring firm’s influence on the
target firm and derive the optimal acquisition share.
Reynolds and Snapp (1986) study the effects of pure financial interest on com-
petition. They show that in a homogenous Cournot oligopoly such passive partial
ownership can relax the competition between the rivals. Jovanovic and Wey (2014)
show that a passive partial ownership can be used to get a full merger approved,
which would be blocked in the first place. They call such a strategy a sneaky
takeover.
Passive partial acquisition can also be multilateral. Malueg (1992) and Gilo
et al. (2006) show that passive partial cross-ownership in rivals can trigger tacit
collusion. Malueg (1992) considers a repeated Cournot duopoly with homogeneous
good, while Gilo et al. (2006) examine a repeated Bertrand game with n symmetric
firms that produce homogeneous goods. Both studies assume that the acquisition
shares are exogenously given.
Karle et al. (2011) also allow for partial cross-ownership, but they focus on a
static model and derive the optimal acquisition share endogenously. They consider
a differentiated Bertrand competition with two firms and an investor that owns
a stake in one firm and can acquire a stake in the second firm either directly or
indirectly via the first firm. They show that the investor might not want to fully
acquire both firms, hence a two product monopoly might not be preferred. In
contrast, we do not allow for cross-ownerships but focus on the effects of market
opacity on the product market outcomes and the optimal acquisition share.
There is also a growing literature on the competitive effects of the partial own-
ership agreements in vertically related markets. The passive acquisitions are con-
sidered by Hunold and Stahl (2016), Greenlee and Raskovich (2006), Fiocco (2016),
Dasgupta and Tao (2000), Baumol and Ordover (1994), and Riordan (2008), while
the acquisition of a controlling stake in a vertically related firm is studied by Gilo
et al. (2016), Spiegel (2013) and Brito et al. (2016).
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1.3 Model
Consider a market in which three firms, A, B and C, produce imperfect substitute
goods. Demand for good i ∈ I = {A,B,C} is given by the following function:
qi(pA, pB, pC) =
1
3
[1− (1 +m)pi + m
3
∑
j∈I
pj] (1.1)
where pi and pj are prices of goods produced by firms i, j ∈ I = {A,B,C} and
m > 0 represents the degree of product differentiation between the goods.2
Suppose firm A acquires a share α in the rival firm B. The outside firm C
neither holds shares in its rival firms nor is owned by any of them. Thus, the
profit functions are:
ΠA(pA, pB, pC) = piA(pA, pB, pC) + αpiB(pA, pB, pC) (1.2)
ΠB(pA, pB, pC) = (1− α)piB(pA, pB, pC) (1.3)
ΠC(pA, pB, pC) = piC(pA, pB, pC) (1.4)
where pii(pA, pB, pC) = piqi(pA, pB, pC) denotes the operating profit of firm i ∈
{A,B,C}. We assume that the unit cost of producing the goods is fixed and
equalize it to zero.
After acquisition, with some probability the acquiring firm A can have a pure
financial interest in the target firm B, so that it only incorporates the profits
generated by firm B in proportion to the share acquired. With the remaining
probability it can additionally have corporate rights, so that it influences firm B’s
strategic decisions. We distinguish between two cases, the first is a benchmark
case wherein the outside firm C can observe whether the acquiring firm has an
influence on the target firm’s strategic decisions or not. Second, we assume that
the partial ownership arrangement is private information to firms A and B.
We study the following two-stage game for both cases. First, firms A and B
decide about the acquisition share α to maximize their joint profit. The firms then
compete in the second stage a` la Bertrand and set prices simultaneously. We solve
2Derived from the utility function of a representative consumer (Shubik and Levitan (1980)):
U(qA, qB , qC) =
∑
i∈I
qi − 32(1+m) [
∑
i∈I
q2i +
m
3 (
∑
i∈I
qi)
2], where I = {A,B,C} and m > 0.
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for the equilibria by backward induction.
1.4 Benchmark case of complete information
We first assume that the outside firm can observe the organizational structure
between the firms taking part in the acquisition.
1.4.1 Price competition
In the second stage, firms compete simultaneously in the product market given the
acquisition share α. We first consider the situation when the acquiring firm has
only a pure financial interest in the target firm, which we call the silent control
scenario. Firm A only incorporates the profits generated by firm B in the propor-
tion of the shares acquired and has no impact on the pricing decision. Hence, the
firms maximize their profits in the usual way:
max
pi
Πi(pA, pB, pC) (1.5)
Under silent control, from the first-order conditions ∂(piA+αpiB)/∂pA = ∂piB/∂pB
= ∂piC/∂pC = 0 we obtain the best response functions:
RsA(pB, pC) =
3 +m((1 + α)pB + pC)
6 + 4m
(1.6)
RsB(pA, pC) =
3 +m(pA + pC)
6 + 4m
(1.7)
RsC(pA, pB) =
3 +m(pA + pB)
6 + 4m
(1.8)
All reaction functions are upward sloping so that an increase in a competitor’s
price leads to a rise in one’s own price.
By solving the best response functions, we calculate the equilibrium prices 3 as
3The second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied: ∂2(piA+αpiB)/∂p
2
A = ∂
2piB/∂p
2
B =
∂2piC/∂p
2
C = −2(3 + 2m)/9 < 0 for every m > 0.
10
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functions of the acquisition share α:
psA(α) =
3(6 + (5 + α)m)
36 +m(42 + (10− α)m) (1.9)
psB(α) = p
s
C(α) =
3(6 + 5m)
36 +m(42 + (10− α)m) (1.10)
We next consider the case when firm A has a decisive influence over firm B,
which we call the total control scenario. Hence, firm A decides not only about the
price of its own product, but also about the price of the product of the target firm.
Thus, the firms face the following maximization problems:
max
pA,pB
ΠA(pA, pB, pC) (1.11)
max
pC
ΠC(pA, pB, pC) (1.12)
From the first-order conditions ∂(piA + αpiB)/∂pA = ∂(piA + αpiB)/∂pB =
∂piC/∂pC = 0 we obtain the best response functions:
RtA(pC) =
α(6 + (5 + α)m)(3 +mpC)
36α + 48αm+ ((14− α)α− 1)m2 (1.13)
RtB(pC) =
(m+ α(6 + 5m))(3 +mpC)
36α + 48αm+ ((14− α)α− 1)m2 (1.14)
RtC(pA, pB) =
3 +m(pA + pB)
6 + 4m
(1.15)
which are all upward sloping.
By solving the relevant best response functions, we obtain the equilibrium
prices4 as functions of α:
ptA(α) =
3α(6 + 5m)(6 + (5 + α)m)
D1(α)
(1.16)
ptB(α) =
3(6 + 5m)(m+ α(6 + 5m))
D1(α)
(1.17)
ptC(α) =
36α(1 +m)(3 + 2m)
D1(α)
(1.18)
4The second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied: ∂2(piA+αpiB)/∂p
2
A = ∂
2piC/∂p
2
C =
−2(3+2m)/9 < 0 and ∂2(piA+αpiB)/∂p2B = −2α(3+2m)/9 < 0 for every m > 0 and 0 < α < 1.
11
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where D1(α) is positive
5 for all 0 < α < 1 and m > 0.
If a merger between firms A and B occurs, we assume for convenience that firm
A acquires all of the shares of firm B, hence, α = 1, and call it a merger scenario.
From (1.16) - (1.18) it is then straightforward to calculate the equilibrium prices
under the merger scenario:
pmA = p
m
B =
6 + 5m
2(6 +m(6 +m))
(1.19)
pmC =
3 + 2m
6 +m(6 +m)
(1.20)
In addition, we also derive competitive prices before any acquisition takes place.
By inserting α = 0 into (1.9)-(1.10), we obtain:
pcA = p
c
B = p
c
C = 3/(6 + 2m). (1.21)
Before deriving the optimal acquisition share α, we examine how the acquisition
share α affects prices in the second stage by differentiating expressions (1.9)-(1.10)
and (1.16)-(1.18) with respect to α. Under silent control, the prices always increase
in α:
∂psi
∂α
> 0, i ∈ {A,B,C}. (1.22)
By acquiring a higher share in its rival, firm A has a higher financial interest in
firm B. Hence, to make the product of firm B more attractive, it increases the price
of its own good. As prices are strategic complements, an increase in the price of
good A, leads firms B and C to increase their prices, too.
One would imagine that an increase in the acquisition share under the total
control scenario would have a similar effect on prices. However, the analysis of
this case is much more involved. When owning only a small share in firm B, firm
A does not care much about the profit of firm B as it only has a small financial
interest in it. Hence, firm A finds it profitable to set the price of good B very high
because it leads to a boost in demand for its own good. By doing so, firm A sends
a credible signal to firm C to also keep the price of its product high. However, as
5The denominator of the prices under total control scenario is equal to: D1(α) = 216α +
432αm+ 6((44− α)α− 1)m2 + (α(46− 5α)− 5)m3 > 0 for 0 < α < 1 and m > 0.
12
1.4. BENCHMARK CASE OF COMPLETE INFORMATION
firm A increases the share in its rival, the financial interest of firm A in the firm
B’s profit increases and firm A cares more about firm B’s profit and thus decreases
the price of good B. Consequently, the prices of firms B and C are decreasing in
α:
∂pti
∂α
< 0, i ∈ {B,C}. (1.23)
If firm A owns only a small share in the rival firm B and has total control over
firm B’s strategic decisions, it might completely shut down firm B. That is, firm A
might find it profitable to set the price of firm B so high, such that firm B does not
sell any of its good. To ensure positive quantities, we need to restrict our attention
to α > m/(6 + 3m).
Lastly, the price of the good of firm A decreases for small α, as firm A collects
a higher profit from selling its own good. However, as the financial interest in the
rival firm B increases, firm A collects a higher share of firm B’s operating profit.
Thus, it is then beneficial for firm A that the profit of firm B is higher. Therefore,
with higher α firm A increases its own price, so it makes good B more attractive.
Thus:
∂ptA
∂α
=
< 0, if α < α¯> 0, if α > α¯ (1.24)
We summarize the previous observations in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.1 Under silent control:
(i) psA(α), p
s
B(α), p
s
C(α) increase in α for every 0 < α < 1
Under total control:
(ii) ptA(α) decreases in α, when α < α¯ and increases in α otherwise
6
(iii) ptB(α) and p
t
C(α) decrease in α for every m/(6 + 3m) < α < 1.
We next compare obtained equilibrium prices and present them in Figure 1.1.
If an acquiring firm has total control over the target firm, it increases the price of
6The threshold α¯ is equal to: α¯ = ((6 + 5m)m2 + 6(216m + 828m2 + 1254m3 + 937m4 +
345m5 + 50m6)1/2)/(216 + 468m+ 324m2 + 71m3)
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ptB
ptA
ptC
psA
psB =p
s
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Figure 1.1: Comparison between prices for m = 30
the target’s product above the merger price. In addition, it keeps its own price
lower than the target’s price and also lower than the merger price, so that it
increases demand for its own product. The outside firm reacts to the acquisition
by increasing its price, which is a positive strategic effect for the firms engaged in
the acquisition. Under the silent control scenario, all three firms raise their prices
higher than competitive prices, but lower than the merger prices. In contrary to
the total control scenario, here the acquiring firm increases its own price higher
than the target firm’s price.
1.4.2 Acquisition
After solving the second stage of the game by deriving the equilibrium prices, we
next solve the first stage by calculating the optimal acquisition share α.
In what follows, we assume that with probability βn(α) the acquiring firm has
a total control over the target firm and with probability 1 − βn(α) only the silent
control. It is natural to assume that when α = 0, firm A has no influence on firm
B, hence βn(0) = 0 and when α = 1 the merger occurs and firm A fully controls
firm B, hence βn(1) = 1. We further assume that βn(α) increases in α and that it
14
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has the following functional form:
βn(α) =

(2α)2n
2
, if α ≤ 1
2
1− (2α−2)2n
2
, if α ≥ 1
2
(1.25)
Parameter n ∈ N controls the steepness of the curve. Specifically, the higher the
parameter n, the steeper the curve at 1/2 and the flatter at the ends of the interval.
The curve has flat tangents at 0 and 1. Moreover, this function is continuous and
differentiable on the whole support. We choose this functional form for βn(α)
because when n→∞, it converges to:
β∞(α) =

0, if α < 1
2
1
2
, if α = 1
2
1, if α > 1
2
(1.26)
which represents the standard 50% rule that is typically assumed in the corporate
finance literature. That is, when the acquiring firm buys less than 50% of the
shares in its target, it has no corporate influence and when it buys more than 50%
of the shares, it fully controls the target firm. Figure 1.2 illustrates function βn(α)
for n = 1 and n→∞.
α
β1(α)
0 1
1
α
β∞(α)
0 11/2
1/2
1
Figure 1.2: Probability of total control for n = 1 (left panel) and n→∞ (right panel)
Given the equilibrium prices, we next solve the first stage of the game by
calculating the optimal acquisition share α such that the expected joint profit of
15
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firms A and B is maximized:
max
α
ΠbAB = βn(α)(pi
t
A + pi
t
B) + (1− βn(α))(pisA + pisB) (1.27)
where pitA = piA(p
t
A(α), p
t
B(α), p
t
C(α)) and pi
s
B = piB(p
s
A(α), p
s
B(α), p
s
C(α)).
The respective first order condition of joint profit is given by:
dΠbAB
dα
=βn(α)
∑
i∈{A,B}
∑
j∈{A,B,C}
∂pii
∂pj
∂ptj
∂α
+ (1− βn(α))
∑
i∈{A,B}
∑
j∈{A,B,C}
∂pii
∂pj
∂psj
∂α
+
∂βn
∂α
(
pitA + pi
t
B − pisA − pisB
)
(1.28)
We first check whether a merger between firms A and B maximizes their joint
profit. If the joint profit would be maximized when the merger occurs, the first
order condition of the joint profit (1.28) would have to be equal to zero when
evaluated at α = 1 and the second order condition would have to be negative.
Then α = 1 implies βn(1) = 1 and 1 − βn(1) = 0, moreover ∂βn(α)/∂α = 0 when
evaluated at α = 1. Hence, equation (1.28) simplifies to:
dΠbAB
dα
=
∂piA
∂pA
∂ptA
∂α
+
∂piA
∂pB
∂ptB
∂α
+
∂piA
∂pC
∂ptC
∂α
+
∂piB
∂pA
∂ptA
∂α
+
∂piB
∂pB
∂ptB
∂α
+
∂piB
∂pC
∂ptC
∂α
(1.29)
Recall that ∂(piA + αpiB)/∂pA = 0 when evaluated in the optimum, p
t
A, and
∂(piA + αpiB)/∂pB = 0 when evaluated in p
t
B, as a result of profit maximization in
the second stage. Therefore, from equation (1.28) we obtain:
dΠbAB
dα
= (1− α)
(
∂piB
∂pA
∂ptA
∂α
+
∂piB
∂pB
∂ptB
∂α
)
+
∂ptC
∂α
(
∂piA
∂pC
+
∂piB
∂pC
)
(1.30)
Subsequently, when α = 1, the first term in equation (1.30) is also equal to zero
and for our demand specification, we have ∂ptC/∂α = 0. We, thus, conclude that
at α = 1
dΠbAB
dα
= 0.
After a routine check of the second order conditions, we show that α = 1
is a local minimum when the goods are not too close substitutes and when the
probability of total control is high. The following proposition summarizes the
16
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result.
Proposition 1.2 Partial acquisition is more profitable than a merger when m >
3(2 +
√
6) and n > 1.
α
ΠbAB
0 10.85 α∗
Figure 1.3: Firm A’s and B’s joint profit for n = 1 (dashed line), n = 2 (solid line) and
m = 100
Figure 1.3 plots firm A’s and B’s joint profit function when n = 1 (dashed
line) and n = 2 (solid line). Recall that, when α > 1/2, the higher n indicates
the higher probability of total control. We observe that when n = 1 the merger
between firms A and B maximizes their joint profit, however, when n ≥ 2, firms
prefer partial ownership.
This result follows from the fact that when the acquiring firm owns less than
100% of the shares in the target firm and has total control over the target, the
competition is even more relaxed than if the two firms would merge. Hence, if the
probability of total control is high, the partial acquisition is preferred by the two
firms in comparison to the merger.
Numerical example 1.1
Due to the analytical complexity, we calculate the optimal acquisition share α∗
numerically. As known from Proposition 1.2 the merger is optimal when n = 1
and m > 0 and also when n ≥ 1 and m < m1 = 3(2 +
√
6). We, therefore, focus
on n > 1 and m > m1.
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In the first instance, we fix m = 30 and n = 2. Inserting n = 2 into equation
(1.25), we obtain
β2(α) =
8α4, if α ≤ 121− 8(α− 1)4, if α ≥ 1
2
(1.31)
By substituting m = 30 and β2(α) = 1− 8(α− 1)2 into equation (1.28), we obtain
the relevant first order condition of firm A’s and B’s joint profit that we next solve
for α. Although we get 11 candidates for a solution, only two lie in the relevant
interval [1/2, 1]. Those are α1 = 1 and α2 ≈ 0.928. From Proposition 1.2, we know
that α = 1 is a local minimum, hence the optimal acquisition share is α∗ ≈ 0.928.
As the product differentiation m increases, the optimal α converges to 0.899.
Similarly, after inserting m = 30 and β2(α) = 8α
2 into the first order condi-
tion (1.28) of firms A’s and B’s joint profit and solve for α, we again obtain 11
candidates for a solution, but none is in the relevant interval [0, 1/2].
m
α∗
0 m1 30
0.618
0.899
0.928
1
n→∞
n = 1
n = 2
Figure 1.4: Optimal α under complete information
We repeat the previous analysis for different values of m and n and summarize
the values of the optimal α in Figure 1.4. The dashed line represents the optimal
α when n = 1, the dash-dotted line characterizes the optimal α when n = 2 and
18
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the solid line when n → ∞. We observe that the higher the probability of total
control, n, and the higher the level of product differentiation, m, the lower the
acquisition share α is necessary to maximize the joint profit.
1.5 Case of asymmetric information
We have so far focused on the case when the outside firm can observe whether
the acquiring firm can control the corporate decision of the target firm. However,
given that it may be difficult to assess the level of influence of the acquiring firm
on the target, we next assume that the outside firm cannot observe if the firm A
has a control over firm B’s pricing decisions or not. In this section, we, therefore,
investigate how asymmetric information influences the firms’ market outcomes and
the optimal acquisition share.
1.5.1 Price competition
Firm C cannot observe whether firm A has control over firm B’s pricing decisions
and knows only the probability βn(α). With probability βn(α) firm A has total
control over pricing decisions of firm B and it chooses pA1 and pB1 to maximize
max
pA1,pB1
piA(pA1, pB1, pC) + αpiB(pA1, pB1, pC) (1.32)
On the other hand, with probability 1−βn(α) firm A has only a silent control over
firm B, meaning, firm A chooses price pA2 and firm B price pB2 to maximize:
max
pA2
piA(pA2, pB2, pC) + αpiB(pA2, pB2, pC) (1.33)
max
pB2
(1− α)piB(pA2, pB2, pC) (1.34)
Firm C does not know if firm A has a total control over firm B and hence it chooses
pC to maximize its expected profit:
max
pC
EpiC = βn(α)piC(pA1, pB1, pC) + (1− βn(α))piC(pA2, pB2, pC) (1.35)
From the first order conditions ∂(piA + αpiB)/∂pA1 = ∂(piA + αpiB)/∂pB1 =
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∂(piA+αpiB)/∂pA2 = ∂piB/∂pB2 = ∂EpiC/∂pC = 0, we derive the following reaction
functions:
RA1(pC) =
α(6 + (5 + α)m)(3 +mpC)
F (α)
(1.36)
RB1(pC) =
(m+ α(6 + 5m))(3 +mpC)
F (α)
(1.37)
RA2(pB2, pC) =
3 +m((1 + α)pB2 + pC)
6 + 4m
(1.38)
RB2(pA2, pC) =
3 +m(pA2 + pC)
6 + 4m
(1.39)
RC(pA1, pB1, pA2, pB2) =
3 +m(βn(α)(pA1 + pB1) + (1− βn(α))(pA2 + pB2))
6 + 4m
(1.40)
where F (α) = 36α + 48αm + ((14− α)α − 1)m2 is positive for all 0 < α < 1 and
m > 0. All reaction functions are upward sloping.
From the reaction functions (1.36) - (1.40) we obtain the equilibrium prices7
as functions of the acquisition share α. With the following simplification G(α) =
36+m(48+(15−α)m), the equilibrium prices of firms A and B have the following
forms:
p∗A1(α) =
3α(6 + 5m)(6 + (5 + α)m)G(α)
D2(α)
(1.41)
p∗B1(α) =
3(6 + 5m)(m+ α(6 + 5m))G(α)
D2(α)
(1.42)
p∗A2(α) =
3(6 + 5m)(6 + (5 + α)m)F (α)
D2(α)
(1.43)
p∗B2(α) =
3(6 + 5m)2F (α)
D2(α)
(1.44)
D2(α)
8 is positive for all 0 < α < 1 and m > 0.
7The second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied: ∂2(piA + αpiB)/∂p
2
A1 = ∂
2(piA +
αpiB)/∂p
2
A2 = ∂
2EpiC/∂p
2
C = −2(3 + 2m)/9 < 0, ∂2(piA +αpiB)/∂p2B1 = −2α(3 + 2m)/9 < 0 and
∂2piB/∂p
2
B2 = 2(−1 + α)(3 + 2m)/9 < 0 for every m > 0 and 0 < α < 1.
8The denominator of the optimal prices is D2(α) = α
3m4(6 + 5m) −m2(6 + 5m)2(6 + (2 +
βn(α))m) − α2m2(432 + m(900 + m(594 + (120 + βn(α))m))) + α(6 + 5m)(1296 + m(3240 +
m(2880 +m(1068 + (141− 2βn(α))m)))).
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While the equilibrium price of firm C is equal to:
p∗C(α) =(3(1− βn(α))m2(6 + 5m)2 + 3α2m2(36 +m(60 + (25− βn(α))m)
+ 6α(6 + 5m)(108 +m(234 +m(162 + (35 + βn(α))m)))))/D2(α)
(1.45)
.
Before deriving the optimal share α, we first examine how α influences the
equilibrium prices by differentiating expressions (1.41)-(1.45) with respect to α.
Note that when the acquisition share is small and firm A has corporate control
over firm B’s decisions, firm A would completely shut down the production of firm
B. Therefore, we restrict our attention on the area where, q∗B1 > 0, that is when
α > m/(6 + 3m).
Under total control scenario, the responses of prices p∗A1 and p
∗
B1 to α are
analogous to the responses of prices ptA and p
t
B in the benchmark case, namely:
∂p∗A1
∂α
=
< 0, if α < αˆ> 0, if α > αˆ (1.46)
∂p∗B1
∂α
< 0, for α >
m
6 + 3m
(1.47)
Under silent control scenario, the responses of p∗A2 and p
∗
B2 to α are the same as
the responses of psA and p
s
B:
∂p∗i2
∂α
> 0, for α >
m
6 + 3m
, i ∈ {A,B} (1.48)
However, given the fact that firm C does not know if firm A has a decisive
influence over firm B, it cannot engage in the collusive behavior as in the case of
complete information. Therefore,
∂p∗C
∂α
=
> 0, if m/(6 + 3m) < α < α˜, n ≥ 2 and 0 < α < 1, n = 1< 0, if α > α˜, n ≥ 2 (1.49)
We summarize the previous observations in the following proposition.
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Proposition 1.3 For every m > 0:
(i) there exists αˆ ∈ (m/(6 + 3m), 1) such that, p∗A1(α) decreases in α, when
α < αˆ and n ≥ 1, and increases in α when α > αˆ and n ≥ 1
(ii) p∗B1(α) decreases in α when m/(6 + 3m) < α < 1 and n ≥ 1
(iii) p∗A2(α) and p
∗
B2(α) increase in α when m/(6 + 3m) < α < 1 and n ≥ 1
(iv) there exists α˜ ∈ (m/(6+3m), 1) such that, p∗C(α) increases in α, when α < α˜
and n ≥ 2 and also when 0 < α < 1 and n = 1 , and decreases in α when
α > α˜ and n ≥ 2.
Figure 1.5 present the comparison between obtained equilibrium prices.
α
p
m
6+3m 1
pmA =p
m
B
pmC
pcA=p
c
B =p
c
C
p∗B1
p∗A1
p∗A2
p∗B2
p∗C
Figure 1.5: Comparison between prices under asymmetric information for n = 2 and
m = 100
As in the case of complete information, the acquiring firm, when having a total
control over the target, raises the price of the target product higher than its own
price and also higher than the merger price. On the other hand, it also keeps
its own price lower than the merger price. In comparison to the benchmark case,
22
1.5. CASE OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
firm C sets its price lower than ptC and higher than p
s
C . As a response, firm A
when having only a silent control over the target sets its price higher than in the
benchmark case (p∗A2 > p
s
A).
Just by looking at prices, we cannot assess the overall influence of the asym-
metric information on the welfare and profits. Therefore, we address this question
separately in Section 1.6.
1.5.2 Acquisition
Given the equilibrium prices, we next solve the first stage of the game by calcu-
lating the optimal acquisition share α such that the expected joint profit of firms
A and B is maximized:
max
α
ΠaAB = βn(α)(piA1 + piB1) + (1− βn(α))(piA2 + piB2) (1.50)
where, for simplicity, piAi = piA(p
∗
Ai(α), p
∗
Bi(α), p
∗
C(α)) and piBi = piB(p
∗
Ai(α), p
∗
Bi(α),
p∗C(α)), i ∈ {1, 2}.
When the merger occurs the joint profit function under complete information,
ΠbAB, coincides with Π
a
AB. Therefore, the result of Proposition 1.2 holds for the
asymmetric case as well.
Proposition 1.4 Under asymmetric information, the partial acquisition is more
profitable than the merger when n > 1 and m > 3(2 +
√
6).
Consider Figure 1.6, which plots firm A’s and B’s joint profit function under
asymmetric information versus their joint profit function under complete infor-
mation. We observe that the optimal α under asymmetric information is always
higher than the correspondent α under complete information. It means that firm
A under asymmetric information scenario has to obtain a higher share in order to
maximize the joint profit. We confirm this in the following numerical example.
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α
ΠAB
0 0.85 1
ΠbAB
ΠaAB
Figure 1.6: Firm A’s and B’s joint profit under benchmark case (dashed line) and the
case of asymmetric information (solid line) for n = 2 and m = 100
Numerical example 1.2
As under complete information, we perform numerical calculations to obtain the
optimal acquisition share α. When the goods are close substitutes, i.e. when
m < m1, the full acquisition α = 1 maximizes the joint profit. While, when
m > m1 and n ≥ 2 we have an interior solution.
We next calculate the optimal α for the same parameter constellation as in the
Numerical example 1 which enable us to compare the optimal α under complete
information versus asymmetric information. For n = 2 and m = 30, we have
α∗ ≈ 0.932. The following Figure 1.7 illustrates optimal level of α as a function
of m, where the dashed line represents the optimal α under complete information
and the solid line under the asymmetric information for n = 2. Under asymmetric
information, firm A needs to buy a higher share in the rival firm B, in order to
assure the joint profit maximization.
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m
α∗
0 m1
0.899
0.905
1
asymmetric
benchmark
Figure 1.7: Optimal α under asymmetric information (solid line) and complete informa-
tion (dashed line) for n = 2
1.6 Welfare effects
Antitrust authorities usually use a social welfare standard to evaluate the anti-
competitive concerns arising from mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, in order to
evaluate the welfare effects of the model at hand, we next compare the obtained
social welfare under asymmetric information to the one under the benchmark case,
and as well to the ones under merger and pre-acquisition.
Social welfare is equal to the utility function of the representative consumer:
SW = U(qA, qB, qC) =
∑
i∈I
qi − 3
2(1 +m)
[∑
i∈I
q2i +
m
3
(∑
i∈I
qi
)2]
(1.51)
where demand qi, i ∈ {A,B,C} is given by equation (1.1).
Before any acquisition takes place, the relevant demand is calculated by sub-
stituting competitive prices given by equation (1.21) into the equation (1.1):
qci = qi(p
c
A, p
c
B, p
c
C) =
1
3
[
1− (1 +m)pci +
m
3
∑
j∈I
pcj
]
=
3 + 2m
18 + 6m
(1.52)
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where i ∈ {A,B,C}. From the demand function, we can then easily calculate the
relevant pre-acquisition social welfare:
SW c = U(qcA, q
c
B, q
c
C) =
1
2
− 9
8(3 +m)2
(1.53)
If firms A and B would merge, the resulting prices are given by equations (1.19)
- (1.20). By substituting them into the equation (1.1), we obtain the following
demands:
qmA = q
m
B = qA(p
m
A , p
m
B , p
m
C ) =
(3 +m)(6 + 5m)
18(6 +m(6 +m))
(1.54)
qmC = qC(p
m
A , p
m
B , p
m
C ) =
(3 + 2m)2
9(6 +m(6 +m))
(1.55)
The social welfare resulting from the merger between firms A and B is:
SWm = U(qmA , q
m
B , q
m
C ) =
486 +m(1044 +m(765 +m(215 + 18m)))
36(6 +m(6 +m))2
(1.56)
The closed forms of the relevant demands and social welfare for the benchmark
case and the case of asymmetric information are rather complex, hence we present
comparisons graphically for n = 2.9
Under the benchmark case of complete information, with probability βn(α) the
firms are in the total control scenario and with probability 1− βn(α) in the silent
control scenario. Therefore, the relevant demands are calculated by substituting
optimal prices, given by equations (1.16)-(1.18) and (1.9)-(1.10), into the demand
function (1.1):
qbi = βn(α)qi(p
t
A, p
t
B, p
t
C) + (1− βn(α))qi(psA, psB, psC) (1.57)
The acquiring firm A, when having total control over firm B, may find it profitable
to increase the price of good B so high, such that firm B does not sell any of its
product. Hence, in order to have only positive quantities, we need to restrict our
attention to α > 0.11. The relevant consumer surplus is SW b = U(qbA, q
b
B, q
b
C).
Under asymmetric information, the optimal prices are given by equations (1.41)-
9We obtain the same result for any n ≥ 2.
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(1.45) and the relevant quantities are:
qai = βn(α)qi(p
∗
A1, p
∗
B1, p
∗
C) + (1− βn(α))qi(p∗A2, p∗B2, p∗C) (1.58)
As in the case of complete information, we need to restrict our attention to qaB > 0
only, and that is satisfied when α > 0.0718. The relevant consumer surplus is
SW a = U(qaA, q
a
B, q
a
C).
α
SW
0 0.11 1
SWm
SW c
SW b
SW a
Figure 1.8: Social welfare under asymmetric information (solid line) and under bench-
mark case (dashed line) for n = 2
Figure 1.8 presents social welfare for both benchmark case and the case of
asymmetric information. The partial acquisition can create greater consumer loss
than a merger when the acquisition share and the probability of decisive influence
are high. Additionally, we see that the social welfare under the benchmark case is
lower than in the case of asymmetric information. This result follows from the fact
that the partial acquisition under complete information serves as a strategic device
to relax competition, as shown in section 1.4.1. However, the fact that the outside
firm cannot observe the organizational structure of firms A and B, prevents firms
of achieving as high collusive outcome. Therefore, under asymmetric information
firms charge lower prices, which leads to higher social welfare.
On the other hand, when acquisition share is low, the partial acquisition does
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not create substantial welfare concerns.
We also compare the relevant profits under the benchmark case and under the
case of asymmetric information. The expected joint profit under the benchmark
case, ΠbAB, is given by equation (1.27), while the expected joint profit under asym-
metric information is specified by (1.50). A direct comparison between ΠbAB and
ΠaAB yields the following result:
Proposition 1.5 For every 1/3 < α < 1, m > 0 and n ≥ 1, the joint profit under
complete information is larger than the joint profit under asymmetric information.
The joint profit functions for the benchmark case and the case of asymmetric
information are presented in the Figure 1.6.
We next calculate the profit of firm C under complete information by substi-
tuting optimal prices, given by equations (1.16)-(1.18) and (1.9)-(1.10), into:
ΠbC = βn(α)piC(p
t
A(α), p
t
B(α), p
t
C(α)) + (1− βn(α))piC(psA(α), psB(α), psC(α))
(1.59)
The relevant profit of firm C under asymmetric information is given by:
ΠaC = βn(α)piC(p
∗
A1(α), p
∗
B1(α), p
∗
C(α)) + (1− βn(α))piC(p∗A2(α), p∗B2(α), p∗C(α))
(1.60)
where optimal prices p∗Ai, p
∗
Bi and p
∗
C , i ∈ {1, 2} are given by (1.41)-(1.45).
Again, a direct comparison between ΠbC and Π
a
C yields the following result:
Proposition 1.6 For every 0 < α < 1, m > 0 and n ≥ 1, the profit of firm C un-
der complete information is larger than it’s profit under asymmetric information.
We conclude that market opacity creates profit losses to all three firms. This,
however, leads to the smaller anticompetitive concerns.
1.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we show that partial horizontal acquisition can impede competition
more than a merger, even when an outside firm cannot observe the organizational
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structure between the firms involved in the acquisition. However, this is the case
only when the acquisition share and also the probability of total control are high.
On the other hand, when the acquisition share is low, partial acquisition does
not create significant welfare concerns. Therefore, our results suggest that the
recent proposal of the European Commission to increase the power of EU antitrust
authority to also review minority shareholders might not be necessary.
When the outside firm can observe whether the acquirer can influence the tar-
get’s decisions, we show that the partial acquisition serves as a strategic device
to relax competition. Yet, when the organizational structure between the firms
taking part in the acquisition is their private information, the firms cannot com-
mit to keep prices as high as in the case of complete information. Hence, they
experience a reduction of profits. This, however, leads to higher social welfare and
thus smaller anticompetitive concerns.
Throughout the article, we focused on a situation where the acquiring firm can
have either control over the target firm or only financial interest in the acquired
firm. However, in practice, the acquiring firm can have the whole range of different
levels of influence on the acquired firm. We expect that relaxing the assumption
of total control would create smaller anticompetitive concerns. A formal analysis
is necessary to answer this question and we leave it for future research.
1.8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.1:
(i) The first derivatives of the optimal prices under silent control (1.9)-(1.10) with
respect to α are:
∂psA
∂α
=
9m(2 +m)(6 + 5m)
(36 +m(42 + (10− α)m))2 (1.61)
∂psB
∂α
=
∂psC
∂α
=
3m2(6 + 5m)
(36 +m(42 + (10− α)m))2 (1.62)
They are positive for all 0 < α < 1 and m > 0.
(ii) The first derivative of the firm A’s optimal price under total control (1.16)
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with respect to α is:
∂ptA
∂α
=
3m(6+5m)(α2(216+m(468+m(324+71m)))−2αm2(6+5m)−m(6+5m)2)
D21(α)
where D1(α) = 216α+432αm+6((44−α)α−1)m2 +(α(46−5α)−5)m3 is positive
for all 0 < α < 1 and m > 0, hence the sign of ∂ptA/∂α depends on the sign of the
numerator. It is negative for
α < α¯ =
(6m2 + 5m3) + 6(216m+ 828m2 + 1254m3 + 937m4 + 345m5 + 50m6)1/2
(216 + 468m+ 324m2 + 71m3)2
and positive otherwise. For every m > 0, we have 0 < α¯ < 1.
(iii) The derivatives of the optimal prices of firms B and C under total control
(1.17)-(1.18) with respect to α are:
∂ptB
∂α
=
−3m(6+5m)(216+m(468−2αm(6+5m)−α2(6+5m)2+m(324+71m)))
D21(α)
(1.63)
∂ptC
∂α
=
−36(1− α2)m2(1 +m)(3 + 2m)(6 + 5m)
D21(α)
(1.64)
They are negative for all m/(6 + 3m) < α < 1 and m > 0. This concludes the
proof of Proposition 1.1.
Proof of Proposition 1.2:
If firm A’s and firm B’s joint profit would be maximized at α = 1, the first order
condition of the joint profit, given by (1.28), would be equal to zero and the
second would be negative. Recall that ∂(piA + αpiB)/∂pA = 0 when evaluated in
the optimum, ptA, and ∂(piA + αpiB)/∂pB = 0 when evaluated in p
t
B, as a result
of profit maximization in the second stage. Therefore, from equation (1.28) we
obtain:
dΠbAB
dα
=βn(α)
[
(1− α)
(
∂piB
∂pA
∂ptA
∂α
+
∂piB
∂pB
∂ptB
∂α
)
+
∂ptC
∂α
(
∂piA
∂pC
+
∂piB
∂pC
)]
+ (1− βn(α))
∑
i∈{A,B}
∑
j∈{A,B,C}
∂pii
∂pj
∂psj
∂α
+
∂βn
∂α
(
pitA + pi
t
B − pisA − pisB
)
(1.65)
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When α = 1, it follows βn(α) = 1, hence 1− βn(α) = 0. Moreover,
∂βn(α)
∂α
=
2n(2α)2n−1, if α < 12−2n(2α− 2)2n−1, if α > 1
2
(1.66)
which is equal to zero, when evaluated at α = 1.
∂βn(α)
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣
α=1
= 0
Substituting these values into the first order condition, given by (1.65), the first
order condition simplifies further to
dΠbAB
dα
=
∂ptC
∂α
(
∂piA
∂pC
+
∂piB
∂pC
)
(1.67)
Furthermore, ∂ptC/∂α is given by equation (1.64) and it is equal to zero when
evaluated at α = 1. We, thus, conclude that at α = 1
dΠbAB
dα
= 0.
To check if α = 1 is a local maximum, a saddle point or a local minimum, we do
the second order conditions. For convenience, we define
piij =
∂pii
∂pj
, i ∈ {A,B} , j ∈ {A,B,C}. (1.68)
In the following, from (1.65) we derive the second order conditions of the joint
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profit with respect to α:
d2ΠbAB
dα2
=
∂βn
∂α
(1− α)
(
∂piB
∂pA
∂ptA
∂α
+
∂piB
∂pB
∂ptB
∂α
)
+
∂βn
∂α
∂ptC
∂α
(
∂piA
∂pC
+
∂piB
∂pC
)
− βn(α)
(
∂piB
∂pA
∂ptA
∂α
+
∂piB
∂pB
∂ptB
∂α
)
+ βn(α)
[
∂2ptC
∂α2
(
∂piA
∂pC
+
∂piB
∂pC
)
+
∂ptC
∂α
(
∂2piA
∂p2C
+
∂2piB
∂p2C
)]
+ βn(α)(1− α)
(
∂2piB
∂p2A
∂ptA
∂α
+
∂piB
∂pA
∂2ptA
∂α2
+
∂2piB
∂p2B
∂ptB
∂α
+
∂piB
∂pB
∂2ptB
∂α2
)
− ∂βn
∂α
∑
i∈{A,B}
∑
j∈{A,B,C}
piij
∂psj
∂α
+ (1− βn(α))
∑
i∈{A,B}
∑
j∈{A,B,C}
(
dpiij
dpj
∂psj
∂α
+ piij
∂2psj
∂α2
)
+
∂2βn
∂α2
(
pitA + pi
t
B − pisA − pisB
)
+
∂βn
∂α
(∂pitA
∂α
+
∂pitB
∂α
− ∂pi
s
A
∂α
− ∂pi
s
B
∂α
)
(1.69)
When α = 1, then again βn(α) = 1, 1− βn(α) = 0 and ∂βn/∂α = 0, therefore,
d2ΠbAB
dα2
=−
(
∂piB
∂pA
∂ptA
∂α
+
∂piB
∂pB
∂ptB
∂α
)
+
∂2ptC
∂α2
(
∂piA
∂pC
+
∂piB
∂pC
)
+
∂2βn
∂α2
(
pitA + pi
t
B − pisA − pisB
)
(1.70)
Additionally:
∂2βn
∂α2
=
4n(2n− 1)(2α)2n−2, if α ≤ 12−4n(2n− 1)(2α− 2)2n−2, if α ≥ 1
2
(1.71)
We next split the analysis in two cases, n = 1 and n ≥ 2. When n = 1:
∂2βn
∂α2
=
4α, if α ≤ 12−4, if α ≥ 1
2
(1.72)
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Hence, (1.70) simplifies to:
d2ΠbAB
dα2
=−
(
∂piB
∂pA
∂ptA
∂α
+
∂piB
∂pB
∂ptB
∂α
)
+
∂2ptC
∂α2
(
∂piA
∂pC
+
∂piB
∂pC
)
− 4
(
pitA + pi
t
B − pisA − pisB
)
=
U(m)
V (m)
< 0 (1.73)
where, U(m) = −m2(186624+m(995328+m(2280960+m(2919456+m(2266416+
m(1081344+m(304970+3m(15188+909m)))))))) < 0 and V (m) = 324(1+m)(6+
m(6 +m))3(12 +m(14 + 3m))2) > 0 for every m > 0. Thus, when n = 1, α = 1 is
a local maximum.
Next, when n ≥ 2, (1.71) evaluated at α = 1 equals:
∂2βn
∂α2
∣∣∣∣∣
α=1
= 0 (1.74)
When n = 2, equation (1.70) leads to:
d2ΠbAB
dα2
= −
(
∂piB
∂pA
∂ptA
∂α
+
∂piB
∂pB
∂ptB
∂α
)
+
∂2ptC
∂α2
(
∂piA
∂pC
+
∂piB
∂pC
)
=
m2(6 + 5m)2((m− 12)m− 18)
324(1 +m)(6 +m(6 +m))3
(1.75)
The last term is positive whenever m > 3(2 +
√
6) ∼ 13.4. We can easily extend
the analysis for every n > 2, but the condition for m does not change. Hence,
we conclude that α = 1 is a local minimum when n ≥ 1 and m > 3(2 + √6).
Therefore, for these parameter values, a total merger is never optimal.
To complete the proof, we need to analyze the case when α = 0. For α = 0, it
is also β(α) = 0, hence, the first order condition for joint profit of firms A and B
(1.28) simplifies to:
∂piB
∂pA
∂psA
∂α
+
∂piA
∂pB
∂psB
∂α
+
∂psC
∂α
(
∂piA
∂pC
+
∂piB
∂pC
)
=
2m2(6 + 5m)(18 +m(30 + 13m))
27(12 +m(14 + 3m))3
(1.76)
which is positive for every m > 0.
From this we conclude, that when m > 3(2 +
√
6) and n > 1, the optimal
acquisition share α is in the interval (0, 1), hence partial ownership is preferred to
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the merger. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.3:
The equilibrium prices under asymmetric information are given by equations (1.41)
- (1.45). Note that the denominator in those equations depends on the probability
of total control, βn(α), and it is equal to:
D2(α) =α
3m4(6 + 5m)−m2(6 + 5m)2(6 + (2 + βn(α))m)− α2m2(432 +m(900
+m(594 + (120 + βn(α))m))) + α(6 + 5m)(1296 +m(3240 +m(2880
+m(1068 + (141− 2βn(α))m)))) (1.77)
By plugging βn(α) given by equation (1.25) into (1.77), we get
¯
D2(α) =α
3m4(6 + 5m)−m2(6 + 5m)2(6 + (2 + 22n−1α2n)m)− α2m2(432
+m(900 +m(594 + (120 + 22n−1α2n)m))) + α(6 + 5m)(1296
+m(3240 +m(2880 +m(1068 + (141− 22nα2n)m)))) (1.78)
for α ≤ 1/2, and
D¯2(α) =α
3m4(6 + 5m)−m2(6 + 5m)2(6 + (3− 1
2
(−2 + 2α)2n)m)− α2m2(432
+m(900 +m(594 + (121− 1
2
(−2 + 2α)2n)m))) + α(6 + 5m)(1296
+m(3240 +m(2880 +m(1068 + (141− 2(1− 1
2
(−2 + 2α)2n))m))))
(1.79)
for α ≥ 1/2. Additionally,
¯
D′2(α) =3α
2m4(6 + 5m)− 2αm2(432 +m(900 +m(594 + (120 + 2−1+2nα2n)m)))
− (6 + 5m)(−1296 +m(−3240 +m(−2880 +m(−1068 + (−141
+ 22nα2n)m))))− 22nα−1+2n(α2m5 + 2αm4(6 + 5m) +m3(6 + 5m)2)n
(1.80)
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is the first derivative of
¯
D2(α) with respect to α and
D¯′2(α) =3α
2m4(6 + 5m)− 2αm2(432 +m(900 +m(594 + (121
− 1/2(−2 + 2α)2n)m)))− (6 + 5m)(−1296 +m(−3240 +m(−2880
+m(−1068 + (−141 + 2(1− 1/2(−2 + 2α)2n))m)))) + 2(−2
+ 2α)−1+2n(α2m5 + 2αm4(6 + 5m) +m3(6 + 5m)2)n (1.81)
is the first derivative of D¯2(α) with respect to α.
To determine whether the equilibrium prices (1.41) - (1.45) are increasing or
decreasing with respect to α, we take the first derivatives of prices with respect to
α.
(i) The first derivative of the firm A’s optimal price p∗A1 with respect to α is:
∂p∗A1
∂α
=
f ′A1D2 − fA1D′2
(D2)2
(1.82)
where fA1(α) = (3α(6+5m)(6+(5+α)m)(36+m(48+(15−α)m)) is the numerator
of price p∗A1 given by equation (1.41) and f
′
A1(α) = −3(6+5m)(−216+m(3α2m2−
4α(3 +m)(6 + 5m)− 3(156 + 5m(22 + 5m)))) is its first derivative.
We first plug D2(α) =
¯
D2(α), given by equation (1.78), and D
′
2(α) = ¯
D′2(α),
given by equation (1.80), into (1.82). We next evaluate the obtained first derivative
(1.82) at the interval endpoints: α = m/(6 + 3m) and α = 1/2.
∂p∗A1
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣
α= m
6+3m
=
1
D3
(27(2 +m)2(6 + 5m)(−(3 +m)(6 + 5m)(7776 +m(22032
+m(24192 +m(12780 +m(3210 + 299m))))) + 4nm(3 + 2m)2
(m/(6 + 3m))2n(−1296− 3240m− 2952m2 − 1152m3 − 161m4
+ 8(3 + 2m)2(36 +m(42 + 11m))n))) (1.83)
where D3 = 4(3 + 2m)(3888 +m(11016 +m(11988 + 6228m+ 1539m
2 + 145m3 −
3 · 4n(2 +m)(3 + 2m)2(m/(6 + 3m))2n)))2 > 0. The derivative is negative
∂p∗A1
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣
α= m
6+3m
< 0 (1.84)
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for all n ≥ 1 and m > 0.
Next, ∂p∗A1/∂α evaluated at α = 1/2 is:
∂p∗A1
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣
α= 1
2
=
1
D4
(m(13436928 + m(67184640 + m(139594752 + 153840384m
+ 93713760m2 + 28102464m3 + 1262088m4 − 1363314m5
− 243295m6 + 2(6 + 5m)(12 + 11m)3(72 +m(96 + 29m))n))))
(1.85)
where D4 = 6(5184 +m(17280 +m(21888 +m(12972 +m(3523 + 344m)))))
2 > 0.
The derivative is positive
∂p∗A1
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣
α= 1
2
> 0 (1.86)
for all n ≥ 1 and m > 0.
The second derivative ∂2p∗A1/∂α
2 is positive for all m/(6 + 3m) < α < 1/2,
n ≥ 1 and m > 0. Therefore, p∗A1 is convex in α for m/(6 + 3m) < α < 1/2.
We next plug D2(α) = D¯2(α), given by equation (1.79), and D
′
2(α) = D¯
′
2(α),
given by equation (1.81), into (1.82) and evaluate it at α = 1:
∂p∗A1
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣
α=1
=
4m(6 + 5m)(18 +m(24 + 7m))((6 +m(6 +m))(18 +m(24 + 7m))
(3(1 +m)(4(6 +m(6 +m))(18 +m(24 + 7m)))2
(1.87)
which is positive for all n ≥ 1 and m > 0. Additionally, ∂p∗A1/∂α is positive for
all α ∈ (1/2, 1).
To summarize, p∗A1 has a negative slope at α = m/(6 + 3m), it is convex
for α ∈ (m/(6 + 3m), 1/2), has a positive slope at α = 1/2, it is increasing for
α ∈ (1/2, 1) and has a positive slope at α = 1.
We thus conclude that there exists some αˆ ∈ (m/(6 + 3m), 1/2), such that
∂p∗A1/∂α < 0 for α < αˆ and ∂p
∗
A1/∂α > 0 for α > αˆ.
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(ii) The first derivative of the firm B’s optimal price p∗B1 with respect to α is:
∂p∗B1
∂α
=
f ′B1D2 − fB1D′2
(D2)2
(1.88)
where fB1(α) = 3(6+5m)(m+α(6+5m))(36+m(48+(15−α)m)) is the numerator
of price p∗B1 given by equation (1.42) and f
′
B1 = 6(6 + 5m)(108 +m(234 +m(165 +
37m− α(6 + 5m)))).
We first plug D2(α) =
¯
D2(α), given by equation (1.78), and D
′
2(α) = ¯
D′2(α),
given by equation (1.80), into (1.88). The computations reveal that ∂p∗B1/∂α is
negative for all α ∈ [m/(6 + 3m), 1/2], m > 0 and n ≥ 1.
We next plug D2(α) = D¯2(α), given by equation (1.79), and D
′
2(α) = D¯
′
2(α),
given by equation (1.81), into (1.88) and get that ∂p∗B1/∂α is negative for α ∈
[1/2, 1], m > 0 and n ≥ 1.
We thus conclude that p∗B1 decreases for all α ∈ [m/(6 + 3m), 1], m > 0 and
n ≥ 1.
(iii) The first derivative of the firm A’s and B’s optimal prices p∗A2 and p
∗
B2
with respect to α is:
∂p∗i2
∂α
=
f ′i2D2 − fi2D′2
(D2)2
(1.89)
where i = A,B and fA2(α) = 3(6 + 5m)(6 + (5 + α)m)(36α + 48αm + ((14 −
α)α− 1)m2) is the numerator of price p∗A2 given by equation (1.43) and fB2(α) =
3(6 + 5m)2(36α+ 48αm+ ((14− α)α− 1)m2) is the numerator of price p∗B2 given
by equation (1.44). f ′A2 = −9(6 + 5m)(−72 − 12(13 + 2α)m − 4(27 + 7α)m2 +
(−23 + (−6 + α)α)m3) and f ′B2 = −6(6 + 5m)2(−18 +m(−24 + (−7 + α)m)) are
their first derivatives.
We first plug D2(α) =
¯
D2(α), given by equation (1.78), and D
′
2(α) = ¯
D′2(α),
given by equation (1.80), into (1.89). The computations reveal that ∂p∗i2/∂α is
positive for all α ∈ [m/(6 + 3m), 1/2], i = A,B, m > 0, and n ≥ 1.
We next plug D2(α) = D¯2(α), given by equation (1.79), and D
′
2(α) = D¯
′
2(α),
given by equation (1.81), into (1.89) and get that ∂p∗i2/∂α is positive for α ∈
[1/2, 1], i = A,B, m > 0, and n ≥ 1.
We thus conclude that both p∗A2 and p
∗
B2 increase for all α ∈ [m/(6 + 3m), 1],
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m > 0 and n ≥ 1.
(iv) The optimal price of firm C, p∗C , is more complex, as the numerator also
depends on βn(α). The first derivative of the firm C’s optimal price with respect
to α is:
∂p∗C
∂α
=
(¯f ′C ¯D2 − ¯fC ¯D
′
2)/(¯
D2)
2, if α ≤ 1
2
(f¯ ′CD¯2 − f¯CD¯′2)/(D¯2)2, if α ≥ 12
(1.90)
where
¯
fC(α) = 1/2(3 · 4nα2nm2(6 + (5 + α)m)2 − 6(6 + 5m)2(−36α − 48αm +
(1 + (−14 + α)α)m2)) is the numerator of price p∗C for α < 1/2 and f¯C(α) =
−(3/2)(−2 + 2α)2nm2(6 + 5m + αm)2 − 36α(1 + m)(3 + 2m)(−36 + m(−48 +
(−15 + α)m)) for α > 1/2. Next,
¯
f ′C = −6(6 + 5m)2(−18 + m(−24 + (−7 +
α)m)) + 34nα−1+2nm2(6 + (5 + α)m)(αm + (6 + (5 + α)m)n) and f¯ ′C = −36(1 +
m)(3+2m)(−36+m(−48+(−15+2α)m))−34n(−1+α)−1+2nm2(6+(5+α)m)(6n+
m(−1 + α + (5 + α)n)).
We first plug
¯
D2(α), given by equation (1.78), and
¯
D′2(α), given by equation
(1.80), and also
¯
fC(α) and
¯
f ′C into (1.90). The computations reveal that ∂p
∗
C/∂α
is positive for all α ∈ [m/(6 + 3m), 1/2], m > 0, and n ≥ 1.
We next plug D¯2(α), given by equation (1.79), and D¯
′
2(α), given by equation
(1.81), and also f¯C(α) and f¯
′
C into (1.90). The computations reveal that ∂p
∗
C/∂α
is positive for all α ∈ [1/2, 1], m > 0, and n = 1.
For n = 2, we evaluate ∂p∗C/∂α at α = 1/2 and at α = 1:
∂p∗C
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣
α= 1
2
=
1
D5
(m2(6 + 5m)(373248 + m(1700352 + m(3129408 + m(2958336
+m(1501368 + m(383368 + 38029m))))))) (1.91)
which is positive for all m > 0, where D5 = 2(5184 + m(17280 + m(21888 +
m(12972 +m(3523 + 344m)))))2. At α = 1, we have
∂p∗C
∂α
∣∣∣∣∣
α=1
= 0 (1.92)
for m > 0.
The second derivative ∂2p∗C/∂α
2 is negative for all 1/2 < α < 4/5, n = 2 and
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m > 0. Therefore, p∗C is concave in α for 1/2 < α < 4/5. Additionally, ∂p
∗
C/∂α is
negative for all α ∈ [4/5, 1).
To summarize, for n = 1, p∗C increases for all α ∈ [m/(6 + 3m), 1) and m > 0.
For n = 2, p∗C increases for α ∈ [m/(6 + 3m), 1/2], it is concave for α ∈ (1/2, 4/5),
and it decreases for α ∈ [4/5, 1). We thus conclude that for n = 2, there exists
some α˜ ∈ (1/2, 4/5), such that ∂p∗C/∂α > 0 for α < αˆ and ∂p∗C/∂α > 0 for α > αˆ.
We can easily extend the analysis for every n > 2.
Proof of Proposition 1.4:
We next derive the optimal α by using the Envelope Theorem:
dΠaAB
dα
=βn(α)
∑
i∈{A,B}
∑
j∈{A,B,C}
∂pii
∂pj
(
∂p∗j1
∂α
+
∂βn
∂α
∂p∗j1
∂βn
)
+
∂βn
∂α
(
pi∗A1 + pi
∗
B1 − pi∗A2 − pi∗B2
)
+ (1− βn(α))
∑
i∈{A,B}
∑
j∈{A,B,C}
∂pii
∂pj
(
∂p∗j2
∂α
+
∂βn
∂α
∂p∗j2
∂β
)
(1.93)
We next assume that α = 1, hence βn(α) = 1, 1− βn(α) = 0 and ∂βn/∂α = 0
dΠaAB
dα
=
∑
i∈{A,B}
∑
j∈{A,B,C}
∂pii
∂pj
∂p∗j1
∂α
(1.94)
Recall that ∂(piA + αpiB)/∂pA = 0 and ∂(piA + αpiB)/∂pB = 0 when evaluated in
the optimum, p∗i1, i ∈ {A,B} as a result of profit maximization in the second stage.
Hence (1.93) simplifies to:
dΠaAB
dα
= (1− α)
(
∂piB
∂pA
∂p∗A1
∂α
+
∂pi∗B1
∂pB
∂p∗B1
∂α
)
+
∂p∗C
∂α
(
∂piA1
∂pC
+
∂pi∗B
∂pC
)
(1.95)
Further on, when α = 1, the first term is equal to zero and for our demand
specification, we have ∂p∗C/∂α = 0. We conclude that in α = 1,
dΠaAB
dα
= 0.
To check if α = 1 is a local maximum, a saddle point or a local minimum, we
must do the second order conditions. For convenience, we define piij = ∂pii/∂pj,
where, i ∈ {A,B} and i ∈ {A,B,C}.
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d2ΠaAB
dα2
=
∂βn
∂α
∑
i∈{A,B}
∑
j∈{A,B,C}
piij
(
∂p∗j1
∂α
+
∂βn
∂α
∂p∗j1
∂βn
)
+ βn(α)
∑
i∈{A,B}
∑
j∈{A,B,C}
(
dpiij
dpj
(
∂p∗j1
∂α
+
∂βn
∂α
∂p∗j1
∂βn
)
+ piij
(
∂2p∗j1
∂α2
+
∂2βn
∂α2
∂p∗j1
∂βn
+
∂βn
∂α
∂2p∗j1
∂β2
))
− ∂βn
∂α
∑
i∈{A,B}
∑
j∈{A,B,C}
piij
(
∂p∗j2
∂α
+
∂βn
∂α
∂p∗j2
∂βn
)
+ (1−βn(α))
∑
i∈{A,B}
∑
j∈{A,B,C}
(
dpiij
dpj
(
∂p∗j2
∂α
+
∂βn
∂α
∂p∗j2
∂βn
)
+ piij
(
∂2p∗j2
∂α2
+
∂2βn
∂α2
∂p∗j2
∂βn
+
∂βn
∂α
∂2p∗j2
∂β2n
))
+
∂2βn
∂α2
(
pi∗A1 + pi
∗
B1 − pi∗A2 − pi∗B2
)
+
∂βn
∂α
(∂pi∗A1
∂α
+
∂pi∗B1
∂α
− ∂pi
∗
A2
∂α
− ∂pi
∗
B2
∂α
)
(1.96)
Again, when α = 1, βn(α) = 1, 1 − βn(α) = 0 and ∂βn/∂α = 0. In addition
∂2βn/∂α
2 = −4n(2n− 1)(2α− 2)2n−2 so for n = 1, ∂2βn/∂α2 = −4 and for every
n ≥ 2, ∂2βn/∂α2 = 0.
Hence, when n = 1 (1.96) simplifies to:
d2ΠaAB
dα2
=
∑
i∈{A,B}
∑
j∈{A,B,C}
(
dpiij
dpj
∂p∗j1
∂α
+piij
(
∂2p∗j1
∂α2
+
∂2β
∂α2
∂p∗j1
∂βn
))
− 4
(
pi∗A1 + pi
∗
B1 − pi∗A2 − pi∗B2
)
(1.97)
which is negative for every m > 0. Thus, for n = 1, α = 1 is a local maximum.
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When n = 2, we have
d2ΠaAB
dα2
=
∑
i∈{A,B}
∑
j∈{A,B,C}
(
dpiij
dpj
∂p∗j1
∂α
+piij
(
∂2p∗j1
∂α2
+
∂2βn
∂α2
∂p∗j1
∂βn
))
= −1
(
∂piB
∂pA
∂p∗A1
∂α
+
∂piB
∂pB
∂p∗B1
∂α
)
+
∂2p∗C
∂α2
(
∂piA
∂pC
+
∂piB
∂pC
)
=
m2(6 + 5m)2((m− 12)m− 18)
324(1 +m)(6 +m(6 +m))3
(1.98)
The last equation is bigger than zero whenever m > 3(2 +
√
6) ∼ 13.4. We can
easily extend the analysis for every n > 2, but the condition for m does not change.
To complete the proof, we need to analyze the case when α = 0. For α = 0, it
is also β(α) = 0, hence, the equation (1.28) simplifies to
∂pisB
∂pA
∂psA
∂α
+
∂pisA
∂pB
∂psB
∂α
+
∂psC
∂α
(
∂pisA
∂pC
+
∂pisB
∂pC
)
=
2m2(6 + 5m)(18 +m(30 + 13m))
27(12 +m(14 + 3m))3
(1.99)
which is positive for every m > 0.
From this we conclude, that the optimal α is in the interval (0, 1), hence the
partial ownership is preferred to the merger. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.5:
After substituting optimal prices pti, p
s
i , i ∈ {A,B,C}, (1.16)-(1.18) and (1.9)-
(1.10) into the equation (1.27) of the firm A’s and B’s joint profit function under
benchmark case, we obtain: :
ΠbAB =
1
D1
((3βn(α)(1 +m)(6 + 5m)
2(−72α2 − 96α2m+ (1 + α(2 + α(−30 + α(2
+ α))))m2)) +
1
(−36 +m(−42 + (−10 + α)m))2 ((−1 + βn(α))(−216
+m(−504 + 3(−130 + α(2 + α))m+ (−5 + α)(20 + 3α)m2))) (1.100)
After substituting optimal prices p∗ij, i ∈ {A,B}, j ∈ {1, 2} and p∗C (1.41)-(1.45)
into the equation (1.50) of the joint profit function of firms A and B under asym-
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metric information, we get:
ΠaAB =
1
D2
((6 + 5m)2(3βn(α)(1 +m)(72α
2 + 96α2m− (1 + α(2 + α(−30 + α(2
+ α))))m2)(−36 +m(−48 + (−15 + α)m))2 + (1− βn(α))(36α + 48αm
− (1 + (−14 + α)α)m2)2(216 +m(504−m(−10(39 + 10m) + α(6 + 5m
+ 3α(1 +m))))))) (1.101)
Direct comparison of the two profit functions completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.6:
After substituting optimal prices pti, p
s
i , i ∈ {A,B,C}, (1.16)-(1.18) and (1.9)-
(1.10) into the equation (1.59) of the expected profit of firm C under complete
information, we obtain:
ΠbC =
144α2βn(α)(1 +m)
2(3 + 2m)3
D1
+
(1− βn(α))(3 + 2m)(6 + 5m)2
(−36 +m(−42 + (−10 + α)m))2 (1.102)
After substituting optimal prices p∗ij, i ∈ {A,B}, j ∈ {1, 2} and p∗C (1.41)-
(1.45) into the equation (1.60) of the expected profit of firm C under asymmetric
information, we obtain:
ΠaC =
[
(3 + 2m)(−(1− βn(α))m2(6 + 5m)2 − α2m2(36 +m(60 + (25− βn(α))m))
+ 2α(6 + 5m)(108 +m(234 +m(162 + (35 + βn(α))m))))
2
]
/D5 (1.103)
where D5 = (−α3m4(6 + 5m) +m2(6 + 5m)2(6 + (2 + βn(α))m) + α2m2(432 +
m(900 +m(594 + (120 + βn(α))m))) +α(6 + 5m)(−1296 +m(−3240 +m(−2880 +
m(−1068 + (−141 + 2βn(α))m)))))2
Direct comparison of the two profits leads to the result.
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Cooperative and noncooperative
R&D in an asymmetric
multi-product duopoly with
spillovers
This chapter is based on Fudickar and Rakic´ (2016).
2.1 Introduction
A firm investing in research and development (R&D) with spillovers usually im-
poses a positive externality on other companies which can then appropriate the
results of this investment. D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) show in a symmet-
ric environment that encouraging firms to collaborate in R&D activities increases
R&D investment and hence, social welfare by internalizing the externality. The
European Commission has recognized these benefits of joint R&D and has thus
issued revised “block exemption” regulations in 2010 that provide an automatic
exemption from competition law for certain types of joint R&D agreements.
We study R&D investment in a market where a multi-product firm produces an
established and an innovative product and a single-product firm only produces an
innovative product. Thereby, we extend the model of D’Aspremont and Jacquemin
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(1988) by incorporating two additional aspects. First, we consider an asymmetric
market environment where a multi-product firm competes with a single-product
firm. Second, the innovative and the established goods are substitutes so that R&D
investment in the innovative product might come at the expense of the sales of the
established product. It is often assumed that innovative products are independent
of any other products that the firms are producing. Such an assumption seems,
however, rather restrictive. Hence, firms have to consider the impact of their R&D
investments not only on the output decision of the innovative product but also on
the established product.
The two extensions enable us to study asymmetric competition between multi-
product and single-product firms as commonly observed in situations where “dirty”
products compete with “clean”, environmentally friendly products. An example of
such a market is the automobile industry. Traditional car manufacturers compete
with firms that specialize in the production of electric vehicles. For example,
Tesla Motors produces exclusively electric cars and competes with more traditional
businesses that produce both electric and gasoline cars. The most challenging
issue related to the future development of electric vehicles is the battery charging.
Companies invest in R&D to improve the loading time and reduce the size and cost
of these batteries. Firms often cooperate in R&D investments to benefit from each
other’s know-how. One example of such a strategic relationship is the cooperation
between Daimler and Tesla Motors, which started in 2009.
Investments in R&D are strategic as they influence product market outcomes.
Hence, when firms compete in R&D, in addition to the direct effect by which firms
benefit from cost reductions, there are two potential strategic effects. Through a
within-product competition effect, a firm’s investment decision indirectly affects its
profit by its influence on its competitor’s output decision of the innovative good.
Depending on the level of the spillover, this effect can be negative or positive.
Particular to our asymmetric set-up is the second strategic effect, the cross-product
competition effect. It states that, in addition to changes in the output of the same
product, the multi-product firm also modifies its output of the established good,
which in turn benefits the single-product firm as it is able to steal some business.
In contrast to R&D competition, we obtain three additional effects under co-
operation. When choosing an investment level to maximize joint profit, firms
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internalize the effect of their R&D investment on the competitor’s profit. Because
of the spillover effect, an increase in R&D investment benefits rival’s profit by
also decreasing its marginal cost; hence, R&D investment is stimulated. More-
over, through the within-product cooperation effect, by investing more, a firm
gains a competitive advantage over its rival in the same product, which hurts
the competitor. The third effect, cross-product coordination effect, is unique to
our multi-product environment. When the multi-product firm increases its R&D
expenditure, it reduces its output of the substitute good to mitigate within firm
cannibalization. This output reduction has a positive impact on the single-product
firm’s profit and hence, increases investment incentives of the multi-product firm.
When the sum of these additional effects of cooperation is positive for a firm,
its investment incentives under cooperation are higher than under competition
because its investment then benefits the other firm. We find that the additional,
positive, cross-product coordination effect of the multi-product firm together with
the spillover effect counteracts the negative within-product coordination effect.
Hence, the profit externality conferred on the profit of the single-product firm is
positive for a greater range of values of the spillover level and the degree of product
differentiation in comparison to the single-product firm.
Our central result states that when the established and the innovative products
are close substitutes, total R&D investment under cooperation will be lower than
under competition even if the spillover is substantial. More specifically, R&D
investment of the single-product firm may be higher under competition than under
cooperation even if the spillover is significant. Moreover, for medium spillovers and
high product substitutability the multi-product firm also invests less under R&D
cooperation. Thus, in contrast to standard results in D’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) which suggest that R&D investment under cooperation is higher than under
competition when the spillover is high, we find that it not only depends on the
technology spillover but also on the degree of product substitutability.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 revises the
related literature. The theoretical model is presented in Section 2.3. In section
2.4 we analyze the retail market equilibrium. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 identify the
investment incentives under competition and cooperation, respectively. In Section
2.7 we compare R&D investment under competition and coordination. Section 2.8
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concludes. The proofs of all formal results are relegated to the Appendix.
2.2 Related literature
As mentioned before, the starting point of our analysis is the study by D’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988), which also serves as our benchmark. They analyze firms’
incentives to invest in R&D with spillovers under R&D competition and coopera-
tion in a symmetric, homogeneous product duopoly. They show that cooperation
increases R&D investment levels compared to competitive R&D only when the
spillovers are sufficiently high. Kamien et al. (1992) extend their model by in-
troducing heterogeneity among the firms. They show that the general results of
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) still hold. The key intuition in that strand of
the literature is that private incentives to conduct R&D are reduced when there
are knowledge spillovers from one firm to another due to free-rider incentives.
Lin and Zhou (2013) analyze R&D investment incentives in a multi-product
environment. They consider R&D investment in a two-product duopoly with dif-
ferentiated goods, where each firm has an initial cost advantage in one of the
products. They find that when a firm invests more in one particular good, its
competitor will respond by investing more in the other good. When the goods
become more substitutable, this effect will be stronger. Moreover, R&D coordina-
tion in R&D lowers investment. In contrast to Lin and Zhou (2013), we analyze an
asymmetric setting without cost advantages, but instead, we allow for spillovers.
Kawasaki et al. (2014) also consider a multi-product model, in which firms
engage in R&D investment. A multi-product firm has a monopoly in one market
and competes with potential entrants in a second market. Contrary to our set-up,
demands for the two products are independent and R&D efforts by the multi-
market firm simultaneously reduce the marginal cost of both goods. They show
that entry can stimulate investment in cost-reducing R&D.
None of those studies, however, considers the interaction between an asymmet-
ric multi-product environment and the dynamics of R&D cooperation. Bulow et al.
(1985) investigate strategic interaction in an asymmetric multi-market oligopoly.
They find that a shock to a firm in one market also affects its competitor’s strategy
in a second market. This finding can be translated into our set-up as we consider
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R&D investment as a strategic interaction. If a firm invests in the new technology
product, the competitiveness of the substitute good is reduced. Therefore, the
incumbent reduces its output of the established good.
2.3 Model
We consider a market with two firms A and B. Firm A is the single producer of
an established product (good 1), while both firms produce a substitute product
(good 2), which is based on a new technology. The prices of the two products are
given by the following linear inverse demand functions1:
p1(qA1, qA2, qB2) = a− qA1 − g(qA2 + qB2) (2.1)
p2(qA1, qA2, qB2) = a− (qA2 + qB2)− gqA1 (2.2)
where a > 0, quantity qji is the output of good i ∈ {1, 2} produced by firm
j ∈ {A,B} and g ∈ [0, 1) represents the degree of product substitutability be-
tween goods 1 and 2. Therefore, the two products in the market are imperfect
substitutes, while good 2 is homogeneous. This asymmetric market structure ex-
ists, for example, in the automobile industry, where traditional car manufacturers,
producing gasoline and electric cars, compete with electric car manufacturers.
Focusing on R&D for the new technology good, we assume that the unit cost of
producing the established good is fixed and equalize it to zero. Hence, only R&D
investment in the new technology good is possible. The unit cost of producing the
new technology good is c > 0, but each firm can invest some xj > 0 in process
R&D to reduce its unit cost2:
cj2 = c− xj − βx−j, (2.3)
where the amount xj is the R&D investment of firm j, the amount x−j is the R&D
investment of the rival, and β ∈ [0, 1] is the spillover of the rival’s R&D investment
on firm j. Hence, firms benefit from their rival’s R&D activity. We assume that
1Derived from the utility function of a representative consumer (Dixit, 1979):
U(qA1, qA2, qB2) = a(qA1 + qA2 + qB2)− 1/2(q2A1 + 2gqA1(qA2 + qB2) + (qA2 + qB2)2)
2We assume that c is high enough, so the new technology is costlier than the established one.
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the R&D cost is quadratic and given by γx2j , where γ > 0. Thus, the profit of the
multi-product firm A is
ΠA = p1(qA1, qA2, qB2)qA1 + [p2(qA1, qA2, qB2)− (c− xA − βxB)] qA2 − γx2A
= piA(qA1, qA2, qB2, xA, xB)− γx2A (2.4)
and the profit of the single-product firm B is
ΠB = [p2(qA1, qA2, qB2)− (c− xB − βxA)] qB2 − γx2B
= piB(qA1, qA2, qB2, xA, xB)− γx2B (2.5)
where pij(qA1, qA2, qB2, xA, xB), j = A,B, denotes the profit gross of R&D invest-
ment cost.
We consider the following two-stage game. In the first stage firms simultane-
ously choose their level of R&D investment (xA, xB) to reduce marginal costs. We
then examine R&D competition and cooperation. Based on their R&D choice, the
firms compete in the second stage a` la Cournot and set their production quantities
simultaneously. We solve for the equilibria by backward induction.
2.4 Retail market outcomes
In the second stage, firms compete simultaneously in the product market given the
R&D investment levels for the new technology good, xA and xB. Firm A maximizes
its profit piA by choosing quantities qA1 and qA2, while firm B maximizes its profit
piB by only choosing quantity qB2. From the first-order conditions ∂piA/∂qA1 =
∂piA/∂qA2 = ∂piB/∂qB2 = 0 we obtain the equilibrium quantities as functions of
the R&D investments3:
q∗A1(xA, xB) =
a(1− g) + g(c− xA − βxB)
2(1− g2) (2.6)
3The second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied: D(qA1, qA2) =
(∂2piA/∂q
2
A1)(∂
2piA/∂q
2
A2) − (∂2piA/(∂qA2∂qA1))2 = 4 − 4g > 0, ∂2piA/∂q2A1 = −2 < 0
and ∂2piB/∂q
2
B2 = −2 < 0.
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q∗A2(xA, xB) =
1
6(1− g2)(a(2− 3g + g
2)− c(2 + g2) + (4 + (2β − 1)g2
− 2β)xA − (2− (2− β)g2 − 4β)xB) (2.7)
q∗B2(xA, xB) =
a− c+ (2β − 1)xA + (2− β)xB
3
(2.8)
To ensure positive output levels in the absence of R&D investments, we assume
that a > c(2+g2)/(2−g(3−g)). When there is no investment in R&D (xA = xB =
0), the multi-product firm produces more of its established good than of its new
technology good because the established good has smaller marginal costs; hence,
obtaining a competitive advantage. Moreover, firm B produces more of good 2
than firm A.
In the first stage, firms choose their R&D investment. We first examine how
firms’ R&D investments affect the market outcomes in the second stage by dif-
ferentiating expressions (2.6)-(2.8) with respect to xA and xB. By increasing its
investment in the innovative product, a firm reduces its marginal cost of that
product. Thereby, it always reacts with an increase in its own quantity of the
innovative product,
∂q∗i2
∂xi
> 0. (2.9)
Due to the technology spillovers, an increase in a firm’s R&D investment not
only reduces its own marginal cost of the new technology good but also reduces
its competitor’s marginal cost of the same product. When β is large, the spillover
effect becomes strong so that the competitor also reacts with an increase in its
quantity of the innovative product,
∂q∗A2
∂xB
= −1
3
+
β(4− g2)
6(1− g2) =
> 0, if β > βˆB ≡
2(1−g2)
4−g2
< 0, if β < βˆB ≡ 2(1−g2)4−g2
(2.10)
and
∂q∗B2
∂xA
=
1
3
(2β − 1) =
> 0, if β > βˆA ≡ 12< 0, if β < βˆA ≡ 12 (2.11)
As the new technology products compete directly with the established product,
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there are also effects of R&D investment in the output of good 1. When R&D
activity in the innovative product by either firm increases, firm A responds with
a reduction in its output quantity of the traditional good:
∂q∗A1
∂xi
< 0, for g > 0. (2.12)
Moreover, by taking the derivative of (2.12) with respect to g, it can be seen that
the closer substitutes the goods are the more firm A suffers in the sales of its
traditional product from investment in the new technology.
2.5 R&D competition
In the first stage, firms invest in R&D taking into account the optimal output
strategy in stage two. Both firms decide on their R&D investments to maximize
their respective profit. Firm i chooses xi to maximize its total profit
Πi = pii(xi, xj, q
∗
i1(xi, xj), q
∗
i2(xi, xj), q
∗
j2(xi, xj))− γx2i (2.13)
where i ∈ {A,B} and j 6= i. The first-order condition for maximizing firm i’s
profit in expression (2.13) is
dΠi
dxi
=
dpii
dxi
− 2γxi = 0. (2.14)
In what follows we assume that γ is large enough so that all second-order conditions
are satisfied in order to have interior solutions.
Assumption 1
γ > γmin ≡ 11g
2 − 20 + β(1− g2)(32− 20β)(g2 − 1)
36(1− g2)
The relevant first-order conditions then lead to the R&D best-response functions
RNA (xB) and R
N
B (xA) for firm A and B, respectively
4. The reaction functions are
downward sloping for low values of β and upward sloping for higher values of β,
as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
4The closed forms are provided in the appendix by formulas (2.26) and (2.27).
50
2.5. R&D COMPETITION
β
g
0 0.5 1
1
R
′N
A < 0
R
′N
A > 0
g¯N(β)
Firm A
β
g
0 0.5 1
1
R
′N
B < 0 R
′N
B > 0
Firm B
Figure 2.1: Signs of slopes of reaction functions
Lemma 2.1 The slope of
(i) RNA (xB) is negative if 0 < β < 1/2 and 0 < g < g¯N(β) and positive elsewhere,
where g¯N(β) ≡
√
4(β − 2)(2β − 1)/(8 + β(8β − 11))
(ii) RNB (xA) is negative if 0 < β < 1/2 and 0 < g < 1 and positive elsewhere.
Lemma 2.1 shows that R&D investments are strategic substitutes when spillovers
are low. Intuitively, an increase in R&D investment by one firm leads to a decrease
in the output of the competitor. R&D investments turn into strategic comple-
ments when spillovers intensify and products are more substitutable. An increase
in R&D by one firm leads to a decrease in the competitor’s marginal cost due to
the technology spillover. This reduction in marginal cost has a positive impact
on competitor’s output decision and thereby increases its incentives to invest in
R&D. To stay competitive with firm B, firm A may also increase its R&D invest-
ment when spillovers are low. This case happens when the products are closer
substitutes.
We next derive the marginal benefit of investment for each firm and identify
different strategic effects that arise under R&D competition.
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By applying the Envelope Theorem to dpiA/dxA in (2.14) we obtain
dpiA
dxA
=
∂piA
∂xA
+︸︷︷︸
direct effect
+
∂piA
∂qA1
∂q∗A1
∂xA︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(envelope theorem)
+
∂piA
∂qA2
∂q∗A2
∂xA︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(envelope theorem)
+
∂piA
∂qB2
−
∂q∗B2
∂xA
−/+︸ ︷︷ ︸
within-product
competition effect
(2.15)
Recall that ∂piA/∂qAi = 0 when evaluated in the optimum q
∗
Ai, i = 1, 2, as a result
of profit maximization in the second stage. By applying the Envelope Theorem to
dpiB/dxB in (2.14) we obtain
dpiB
dxB
=
∂piB
∂xB
+︸︷︷︸
direct effect
+
∂piB
∂qB2
∂q∗B2
∂xB︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(envelope theorem)
+
∂piB
∂qA2
−
∂q∗A2
∂xB
−/+︸ ︷︷ ︸
within-product
competition effect
+
∂piB
∂qA1
−
∂q∗A1
∂xB
−︸ ︷︷ ︸
cross-product
competition effect
(2.16)
We also recall that ∂piB/∂qB2 = 0 when evaluated in the optimum q
∗
B2 as a result
of profit maximization in the second stage.
Each firm invests in R&D to reduce the costs of its innovative product. Those
investments affect firms’ profits in different ways. First of all, there is a direct effect
of R&D investment, but additionally we identify two types of strategic effects:
(i) within-product competition effect. - A firm’s investment decision indirectly
affects its own profit through its influence on its competitor’s output decision
of the same product.
(ii) cross-product competition effect. - A firm’s investment decision indirectly
affects its own profit through its influence on its competitor’s output decision
of the substitute product.
We summarize the effects of R&D investments under R&D competition on the
firms’ gross profits (i.e. excluding R&D costs) in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 An increase in firm j’s R&D investment xj affects its profits
(i) positively through the direct effect
(ii) positively for 0 ≤ β < βˆj and negatively otherwise through the within-product
competition effect. 5
5The critical spillover βˆj , j ∈ {A,B} is defined by equations (2.10) and (2.11)
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Additionally,
(iii) an increase in firm B’s R&D investment also influences its own profit posi-
tively through the cross-product competition effect.
Intuitively, the direct effect is always positive. This direct effect results from the
fact that an increase in the level of R&D investment leads to a reduction in firm’s
marginal cost of the new technology good, which in turn leads to an increase in
its profit.
Due to knowledge spillovers, an increase in a firm’s R&D investment also re-
duces its rival’s marginal cost. However, only when spillovers are significant, the
competitor’s marginal cost is reduced substantially so that it also reacts more
aggressively and increases its output level. Then profit of the investing firm is
reduced. Hence, the within-product competition effect increases R&D incentives of
a firm when spillovers are low and decreases them for large spillovers. Only small
spillovers create a real competitive advantage for an investing firm because large
spillovers create greater potential for free-riding.
The cross-product competition effect is specific to the single-product firm. It
only prevails in our asymmetric environment. As the multi-product firm produces
two substitute goods, it influences the single-product firm’s optimal R&D deci-
sion not only through its response regarding its output decision of the new tech-
nology product but also regarding its output decision of the traditional product.
Clearly, the multi-product firm lowers its output of the traditional product because
that good loses its competitive advantage. The single-product firm then benefits
from that output reduction as its competitiveness towards the established good
increases. The cross-product competition effect, therefore, always raises investment
incentives for firm B.
The marginal benefit of firm A’s cost-reducing investment depends only on the
relative magnitudes of the direct effect and the within-product competition effect.
Formally,
dpiA
dxA
=
1
3
g(1− 2β)qA1 + 2
3
(2− β)qA2 (2.17)
The overall marginal benefit of firm B’s cost-reducing investment under R&D
competition additionally depends on the cross-product competition effect. Hence,
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we obtain
dpiB
dxB
=
2
3
(2− β)qB2. (2.18)
As the latter is positive, firm B always has an incentive to invest in R&D. On the
contrary, firm A’s investment incentives can be negative if β > 1/2 and g is very
high. Under such a parameter constellation, firm A would not invest at all so that
then xA = 0.
2.6 R&D cooperation
We next consider cooperation in R&D investment while the second stage remains
competitive. In the first stage firms choose investment levels xA and xB by maxi-
mizing their joint profits given by (2.13):
max
xA,xB
ΠA + ΠB
= piA(xA, xB, q
∗
1A(xA, xB), q
∗
2A(xA, xB), q
∗
2B(xA, xB))
+ piB(xA, xB, q
∗
1A(xA, xB), q
∗
2A(xA, xB), q
∗
2B(xA, xB))
− γx2A − γx2B (2.19)
The first-order condition for investment under joint profit maximization for
firm i in expression (2.19) is
d(ΠA + ΠB)
dxi
=
d(piA + piB)
dxi
− 2γxi = 0 (2.20)
where d(piA+piB)/dxA and d(piA+piB)/dxB are net marginal increases in the firms’
joint profit. This then leads to
RCi (xj) = argmax
xi
[ΠA + ΠB]. (2.21)
For convenience and abusing somewhat usual conventions we call RCi (xj), in what
follows, reaction functions under cooperation6.
6The closed forms are given in the Appendix by formulas (2.43) and (2.44).
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Lemma 2.2 The slope of RCi (xj) under R&D cooperation is negative if 0 ≤ β <
1/2 and 0 ≤ g ≤ g¯C(β) ≡
√
8(β − 2)(2β − 1)/(16 + β(16β − 31)) and positive
otherwise.
Specifically, for the R&D investment level of firm A, by applying the Envelope
Theorem, we obtain the following marginal benefit of joint profit maximization:
d(piA + piB)
dxA
=
dpiA
dxA
+
dpiB
dxA
=
dpiA
dxA︸︷︷︸
Prop. 2.1
+
∂piB
∂xA
+︸︷︷︸
spillover effect
+
∂piB
∂qA2
−
∂q∗A2
∂xA
+︸ ︷︷ ︸
within-product
coordination effect
+
∂piB
∂qA1
−
∂q∗A1
∂xA
−︸ ︷︷ ︸
cross-product
coordination effect
(2.22)
Similarly, we obtain the following result for firm B’s investment:
d(piA + piB)
dxB
=
dpiB
dxB
+
dpiA
dxB
=
dpiB
dxB︸︷︷︸
Prop. 2.1
+
∂piA
∂xB
+︸︷︷︸
spillover effect
+
∂piA
∂qB2
−
∂q∗B2
∂xB
+︸ ︷︷ ︸
within-product
coordination effect
(2.23)
Cooperation may increase the incentive to conduct R&D by internalizing spillovers
across the firms. However, R&D investment makes firms tougher competitors;
hence, the effect of cooperation may be to reduce the incentive to conduct R&D.
The (strategic) effects of the first term, dpii/dxi, i = A,B, are derived and
analyzed under R&D competition in Section 2.5 above. Under cooperation, each
firm, also cares about how its choice of R&D investment affects the profit of its
competitor. Hence, we identify a spillover effect and two further strategic effects
under R&D cooperation:
(i) within-product coordination effect. - A firm’s investment decision is influ-
enced by the effect on its competitor’s profit through changes in its own
output decision of the same product.
(ii) cross-product coordination effect. - A firm’s investment decision is influenced
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by the effect on its competitor’s profit through its own output decision of
the substitute product.
We summarize the additional effects of R&D investment due to cooperation on
the firms’ joint gross profit in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2 When xi increases, firm j’s profit is influenced
(i) positively through the spillover effect
(ii) negatively through the within-product coordination effect.
Additionally,
(iii) when firm A increases its R&D investment, it also influences firm B’s profit
positively through the cross-product cooperation effect.
When R&D by one firm spills over to the other firm, private incentives to conduct
R&D are reduced due to potential free-riding. If firms choose R&D investment
levels cooperatively, then these spillover externalities are internalized, and R&D
investment is stimulated. An increase in one firm’s R&D investment reduces the
other firm’s cost due to the technology spillover; hence, lower costs increase rivals
profit.
The within-product coordination effect decreases a firm’s investment incentives
as it also cares about its rival’s profit under cooperation. When a firm invests
more in the new technology, it increases its output of the innovative product, as
seen in expression (2.9). As a result, the competitor faces a decline in its market
share and suffers from a loss of its profit.
The cross-product coordination effect only exists for the multi-product firm in
this asymmetric set-up as it internalizes its positive impact on the single-product
firm’s profit when it reduces its output of the traditional good to mitigate within-
firm cannibalization. The cross-product coordination effect is always positive be-
cause the new technology good becomes more competitive towards the established
good by approaching the cost level of the established good. This effect is strength-
ened if the products are closer substitutes because then the multi-product firm will
lose a significant competitive advantage in the established good.
Within-product competition and cooperation effects indicate how R&D invest-
ment influence profits through the new technology good, whereas the cross-product
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competition and coordination effects indicated how R&D investment influence
profits through the traditional good.
The overall marginal benefit of a firm’s cost-reducing investment under R&D
cooperation depends on the relative magnitudes of the direct and spillover effects
and three strategic effects, where some of the strategic effects differ for the multi-
product and the single-product firm.
2.7 R&D competition vs. cooperation
We next analyze the equilibrium R&D investment levels of each firm under com-
petition and cooperation. In order to do so, we compare the reaction functions
RCi (xj) and R
N
i (xj) in the xA − xB-diagram. Whether RCi (xj) under coopera-
tion lies above or below RNi (xj) under competition depends only on the sign of
the profit externality, dpij/dxi, in equations (2.22) and (2.23). If R
C
i (xj) is above
(below) RNi (xj), a firm will respond with a higher (lower) investment level under
cooperation than under competition.
By adding the spillover-, within-product coordination- and cross-product
coordination-effects of expression (2.22), we obtain the profit externality conferred
by A’s R&D investment on the profit of firm B:
dpiB
dxA
=
2
3
(2β − 1)qB2 (2.24)
Since qB2 is always positive, the position of R
C
A(xB) depends only on the level of
the spillovers.
Lemma 2.3 For all 0 ≤ g < 1, RCA(xB) lies below RNA (xB) if 0 ≤ β < 1/2 and
above RNA (xB) if 1/2 < β ≤ 1.
The result follows from the fact that the negative within-product coordination
effect outweighs the sum of the positive spillover- and cross-product cooperation
effects when the spillover is small, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. However, when the
spillover is large, the opposite is true.
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Figure 2.2: Positions of reaction functions
From expression (2.23) we derive the profit externality of firm B’s R&D invest-
ment on the profit of firm A:
dpiA
dxB
=
2
3
(2β − 1)qA2 − 1
3
g(2− β)qA1 (2.25)
The first term, 2(2β − 1)qA2/3, is positive if and only if β > 1/2, whereas the
second term, −g(2 − β)qA1/3, is always negative. Hence, the position of RCB(xA)
of firm B under cooperation depends not only on the knowledge spillover but also
on the degree of product differentiation between goods 1 and 2. The reaction
function RCB(xA) lies above R
N
B (xA) whenever the second term is negligible; that
is if g approaches zero.
Lemma 2.4 There is an upward sloping function gCB(β) : [1/2, 1] → (0, 1) such
that RCB(xA) lies above R
N
B (xA) if 1/2 < β ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ g ≤ gCB(β), and below
otherwise.
Firm B also internalizes the impact of its R&D on the other firm through co-
operation. However, as firm B only produces the innovative good, the positive
cross-product coordination effect on firm A’s established product does not exist.
Hence, there are only two opposing effects of R&D cooperation on the investment
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incentives of firm B. On one hand, if firms choose R&D investment levels coop-
eratively, then the spillover externalities are internalized, and R&D investment is
stimulated. On the other hand, the within-product coordination effect counteracts
this positive effect on R&D investment incentives and may even dominate it when
spillovers are high and product substitutability is high. This case happens when
firm A’s loss in profit due to a decline in its market share in both products will
not be offset by an increase in its profit due to reduced marginal cost. If the prod-
ucts are close substitutes firm A will lose significant market power in product 1
following R&D investment by firm B which cannot be offset by the spillover effect.
Having analyzed the effect of cooperation on the incentives to invest in R&D
we are now able to determine the equilibrium R&D investment levels of both firms.
The directions of the slopes of the reaction functions under R&D competition and
under R&D cooperation are known from Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. In
addition, Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 describe the positions of the respective reaction
functions under R&D cooperation compared to R&D competition. We note that
these functions are linear7.
If spillovers are sufficiently low (i.e. 0 ≤ β < 1/2), we know from Lemmas
2.3 and 2.4 that both RCA(xB) and R
C
B(xA) are below the reaction functions under
competition for all degrees of product substitutability. Hence, it follows directly
that, in this case, R&D investment levels under cooperation are lower than under
R&D competition. Figure 2.3 illustrates this in the xA − xB-diagram.
Similarly, if spillovers are sufficiently high (i.e. 1/2 ≤ β ≤ 1) and at the same
time, the degree of product substitutability is low (i.e. 0 ≤ g < gCB(β)), then
both RCA(xB) and R
C
B(xA) lie above the reaction functions under competition. It
is thus straightforward to see that then R&D investment levels under cooperation
are higher for both firms.
When the positions are in the same direction, it is simple to determine the effect
of cooperation on R&D levels. However, when this is not the case, it becomes more
cumbersome. We illustrate all different cases subsequently.
Let us consider the case when 1/2 ≤ β ≤ 1 and gCB(β) < g < 1, which is
illustrated in Figure 2.4. By Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, slopes of all reaction functions
are upward sloping. By Lemma 2.3 RCA(xB) lies above R
N
A (xB) , while by Lemma
7This is easily seen from equations (2.26) - (2.27) and (2.43) - (2.44).
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0 < β < 1/2, 0 < g < g¯N(β)
Figure 2.3: Optimal R&D investment levels under competition and cooperation
2.4 RCB(xA) lies below R
C
B(xA).
We observe two possible scenarios. First, the difference between RCi (xj) and
RNi (xj) is of similar size and second, the difference between R
C
B(xA) and R
N
B (xA)
is significantly larger than the difference between RCA(xB) and R
N
A (xB). The latter
one occurs when the spillover approaches 1/2 and the degree of substitutability
is positive. Then, we observe from equation (2.24) that the difference (RCA(xB)−
RNA (xB)) is approaching zero. Additionally, the difference (R
C
B(xA) − RNB (xA)) is
significant as the first term in equation (2.25) is negligible, while the second term
increases as g increases.
From the two diagrams in Figure 2.4 we can see that, in the observed interval,
the R&D investment level of firm B is lower under cooperation than under com-
petition. Additionally, the R&D investment level of firm A could also be lower
under cooperation than under competition when β → 1/2 and g 6= 0.
In the following Proposition, we summarize the effects of R&D cooperation on
the investment levels of both firms when all parameter constellations are taken
into account. Figure 2.5 illustrates these results graphically.
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β → 1/2, gCB(β) < g < 1
Figure 2.4: Optimal R&D investment levels under competition and cooperation
Proposition 2.3 There is an upward sloping function gCA(β) : [0, 1]→ (0, 1) such
that:
(i) xCA < x
N
A if 0 < β ≤ 1/2 and 0 < g ≤ 1 and 1/2 < β < 1 and gCA(β) < g < 1;
otherwise xCA > x
N
A .
(ii) xCB < x
N
B if 0 < β ≤ 1/2 and 0 < g ≤ 1 and 1/2 < β < 1 and gCB(β) < g < 1;
otherwise xCB > x
N
B .
We find that whether the level of R&D investment, xi, increases or decreases
following cooperation depends not only on the technological spillover but also on
the degree of substitution between the two products. If spillovers are sufficiently
high and the degree of substitution is relatively low, R&D investment levels under
cooperation exceed those of competition. The internalization leads to an increase
in R&D because the positive effect of the spillover on firm j′s profit is higher than
the adverse effect of the reduction in the marginal cost on firm j′s profit.
If the products are independent (g = 0), our result replicates the standard
result by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), as seen in Figure 2.5. Due to the
positive product differentiation in our analysis, we find that the R&D investment of
firm B is higher under competition than under cooperation even when the spillover
is high.
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of R&D investments under competition and cooperation
From a policy perspective, it is important to determine the overall effect of
cooperation on total R&D due to the marginal cost reduction. Total R&D depends
on the sum of the changes in xA and xB. Let total competitive R&D investment
be xN ≡ xNA + xNB and total cooperative R&D investment be xC ≡ xCA + xCB. The
next proposition directly follows from Proposition 2.3. Figure 2.6 illustrates the
result.
Proposition 2.4 Total investment under cooperation is lower than under compe-
tition if 0 < β ≤ 1/2 and g > 0 and if 1/2 < β < 1 and g high enough.
When β > 1/2 and gCB(β) < g < g
C
A(β), cooperation will reduce xB but increase
xA. It is, therefore, unclear whether R&D competition or R&D cooperation lead
to a higher overall investment level. The net effect on total R&D will depend on
the magnitudes of these changes.
We simulate the overall effect of cooperation on total R&D. We use the follow-
ing specification: a = 1000, c = 50 and γ = 60. The resulting Figure 2.6 shows
that, indeed, there exists a function gC(β), such that for for every g > gC(β) and
β > 1/2 the overall investment in R&D under competition is greater than under
R&D cooperation.
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Figure 2.6: Comparison of total R&D investment
2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study strategic R&D investment between a multi-product firm
and a single-product firm. Investigating whether such asymmetric firms should
be allowed to coordinate their decisions at the R&D stage, as in D’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988), we find that R&D investment levels under cooperation
are lower when the established and the innovative product are close substitutes
even if the spillover is substantial. Hence, the asymmetry between the firms leads
to higher R&D investment levels under competition than under cooperation for
many values of the technology spillovers and degrees of product substitution. Our
results, therefore, indicate that regulators need to be more cautious about allowing
R&D joint ventures in an asymmetric context.
Besides, we also identify several strategic effects that are incorporated under
R&D cooperation. For the multi-product firm, investment incentives are lower
under cooperation when spillovers are low because the negative within-product
coordination effect then dominates the positive spillover and cross-product coor-
dination effects. For the single-product firm, if product substitutability is high,
investment incentives are also lower under cooperation even when spillovers are sig-
nificant. Following R&D investment by the single-product firm, the multi-product
firm would lose significant market share in the established good if the products
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are close substitutes. Then this loss cannot be offset by the spillover effect.
It would seem natural to assume that the spillovers of the two firms are not
identical, given that large multi-product firms can protect their patents better
than smaller firms. Hence, we can extend our analysis for asymmetric spillovers,
namely βA < βB. However, our main result (Proposition 2.4) still holds.
2.9 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.1:
From the optimal quantities (2.6)-(2.8) in the second stage and profit maximization
of (2.13) with respect to xi the relevant first-order conditions lead to the following
R&D best-response functions
RNA (xB) =
1
K1
(a(g − 1)(g − 8 + 4β(1 + g))− c(8 + g2 + 4β(g2 − 1))
+ (4(2− β)(2β − 1) + (8 + β(8β − 11))g2)xB) (2.26)
RNB (xA) =
(2− β)(a− c− (1− 2β)xA)
9γ − (2− β)2 (2.27)
where K1 = 36γ(1−g2)−16+7g2 +4β(β−4)(g2−1). The derivative with respect
to the strategic variable of the competitor, xj, yields the slope of the reaction
function. For firm A, we obtain from (2.26)
dRNA (xB)
dxB
=
(8 + β(8β − 11))g2 − 4(β − 2)(2β − 1)
36γ(1− g2)− 16 + 7g2 + 4β(β − 4)(g2 − 1) (2.28)
To determine the slope of RNA (xB) we need the sign of (2.28). By assumption 1
the denominator is always positive. Hence, it remains to show the sign of the
numerator of (2.28), which has two components. The first component, (8+β(8β−
11))g2 is positive for all 0 < β < 1 and 0 < g < 1. The second component,
−4(β − 2)(2β − 1), is, for all g ≥ 0, positive if 1/2 < β < 1 and negative if
0 < β < 1/2.
Therefore, the derivative in expression (2.28) is always positive if 1/2 ≤ β < 1.
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Moreover, if 0 < β < 1/2, it is also positive if substitutability is high:
g > g¯N(β) ≡
√
4(β − 2)(2β − 1)
8 + β(8β − 11) (2.29)
For 0 < β < 1/2 and 0 < g < g¯N(β), the derivative is negative.
For firm B, we obtain from (2.27)
dRNB (xA)
dxA
=
(2− β)(2β − 1)
9γ − (2− β)2 (2.30)
The sign of sign of (2.30) determines the slope of RNB (xA). Substituting γ >
γmin (assumption 1) into the denominator we find that the denominator is always
positive. Then it is easy to see that for all g > 0 the derivative in (2.30) is positive
if 1/2 < β < 1 and negative if 0 < β < 1/2.
Hence, this concludes the proof of Lemma 2.1.
Proof of Proposition 2.1:
First, we derive each effect in (2.15) for firm A separately:
(i) From (2.1), (2.2) and (2.4), the direct effect
∂piA
∂xA
= qA2 > 0 (2.31)
is always positive.
(ii) The within-product competition effect consists of two components. From
(2.1), (2.2) and (2.4), the first component
∂piA
∂qB2
= −(gqA1 + qA2) < 0 (2.32)
is always negative. The second component derived from (2.8)
∂q∗B2
∂xA
=
2β − 1
3
(2.33)
is positive if 1/2 < β ≤ 1, zero if β = 1/2 and negative otherwise. Hence, the
within-product competition effect
∂piA
∂qB2
∂q∗B2
∂xA
= −2β − 1
3
(gqA1 + qA2) (2.34)
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is negative if 1/2 < β ≤ 1, zero if β = 1/2 and positive otherwise.
Second, we derive each effect in (2.16) for firm B:
(i) From (2.1), (2.2) and (2.5), the direct effect
∂piB
∂xB
= qB2 > 0 (2.35)
is always positive.
(ii) The within-product competition effect consists of two components. Also
from (2.1), (2.2) and (2.5), the first component
∂piB
∂qA2
= −qB2 < 0 (2.36)
is always negative. The second component derived from (2.7) is given by
∂q∗A2
∂xB
=
4β + (2− β)g2 − 2
6(1− g2) (2.37)
The denominator is always positive for 0 < g < 1. Hence, the whole term is
positive if
β >
2g2 − 2
g2 − 4 ≡ β¯ (2.38)
Hence, the within-product competition effect
∂piB
∂qA2
∂q∗A2
∂xB
= −4β + (2− β)g
2 − 2
6(1− g2) qB2 (2.39)
is negative if β¯ < β < 1 and 0 ≤ g < 1 and positive otherwise.
(iii) The cross-product competition effect consists of two components. Also
derived from (2.1), (2.2) and (2.5),the first component
∂piB
∂qA1
= −gqB2 < 0 (2.40)
is negative. The second component derived from (2.6)
∂q∗A1
∂xB
= − βg
2(1− g2) < 0 (2.41)
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is also negative. Hence, the cross-product competition effect
∂piB
∂qA1
∂q∗A1
∂xB
=
βg2
2(1− g2)qB2 > 0 (2.42)
is positive ∀β, g.
Proof of Lemma 2.2:
From optimal second stage quantities (2.6)-(2.8) and joint profit maximization of
(2.19) with respect to xi the relevant first-order conditions yield xi as a function
of xj:
RCA(xB) =
1
K2
(−4(1 + β)c+ (4β − 5)cg2 − a(g − 1)(4− 5g + 4β(1 + g))
+ (−8(β − 2)(2β − 1) + (16 + β(16β − 31))g2)xB) (2.43)
RCB(xA) =
1
K3
(−c(4(1 + β) + (5β − 4)g2) + a(g − 1)(−4(1 + g) + β(5g − 4))
+ (−8(β − 2)(2β − 1) + (16 + β(16β − 31))g2)xA) (2.44)
where K2 = 36γ(1 − g2) − 20 + 11g2 + 4β(5β − 8)(g2 − 1) and K3 = −32β(g2 −
1) + β2(11g2 − 20)− 4(g2 − 1)(9γ − 5). The derivative of RCi (xj) with respect to
the strategic variable of the competitor, xj, yields the slope of R
C
i (xj). For firm
A, we obtain from (2.43)
dRCA(xB)
dxB
=
(16 + β(16β − 31))g2 − 8(β − 2)(2β − 1)
36γ(1− g2)− 20 + 11g2 + 4β(5β − 8)(g2 − 1) (2.45)
In order to determine the slope, we need the sign of (2.45). By assumption 1 the
denominator is always positive. It remains to show the sign of the numerator of
(2.45), which has two components. The first component, (16 + β(16β − 31)g2) is
positive for all 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ g < 1. The second component, −8(β−2)(2β−1),
is positive if 1/2 < β ≤ 1 and negative if 0 ≤ β < 1/2. Therefore, the derivative
in expression (2.45) is always positive if 1/2 ≤ β ≤ 1. Moreover, if 0 ≤ β < 1/2,
it is also positive if substitutability is high:
g > g¯C(β) ≡
√
8(β − 2)(2β − 1)
16 + β(16β − 31) (2.46)
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For 0 ≤ β ≤ 1/2 and 0 ≤ g ≤ g¯C(β), the derivative is negative.
For firm B, we obtain from (2.44)
dRB(xA)
dxA
=
(16 + β(16β − 31))g2 − 8(β − 2)(2β − 1)
−32β(g2 − 1) + β2(11g2 − 20)− 4(g2 − 1)(9γ − 5) (2.47)
In order to determine the slope of RCB(xA), we need to determine the sign of (2.47).
By assumption 1 we find that the denominator is always positive. It remains to
show the sign of the numerator of (2.47), which is equivalent to the numerator of
(2.45). Hence, for 0 ≤ β < 1/2 and 0 ≤ g ≤ g¯C(β), the derivative is negative.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 2.2.
Proof of Proposition 2.2:
First, we derive each part in (2.22) for firm A. The first term, dpiA/dxA is derived
in proposition 2.1. We use (2.1), (2.2) and (2.5) to determine some of the following
components.
(i) The spillover effect given by
∂piB
∂xA
= βqB2 > 0 (2.48)
is positive.
(ii) The within-product coordination effect consists of two components. The
first component
∂piB
∂qA2
= −qB2 < 0 (2.49)
is always negative. The second component derived from (2.7) is given by
∂q∗A2
∂xA
=
4 + (2β − 1)g2 − 2β
6(1− g2) (2.50)
The term is always positive for all β, g ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, the within-product coordi-
nation effect
∂piB
∂qA2
∂q∗A2
∂xA
= −4 + (2β − 1)g
2 − 2β
6(1− g2) qB2 (2.51)
is always negative.
(iii) The cross-product coordination effect consists of two components. The
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first component
∂piB
∂qA1
= −gqB2 < 0 (2.52)
is negative. The second component derived from (2.6)
∂q∗A1
∂xA
= − g
2(1− g2) < 0 (2.53)
is also negative. Hence, the cross-product coordination effect
∂piB
∂qA1
∂q∗A1
∂xA
=
g2
2(1− g2)qB2 > 0 (2.54)
is positive ∀β, g.
Second, we derive each effect of firm B in (2.23). The first term, dpiB/dxB is
derived in proposition 2.1. For the following components, we use (2.1), (2.2) and
(2.4).
(i) The spillover effect given by
∂piA
∂xB
= βqA2 > 0 (2.55)
is positive.
(ii) The within-product coordination effect consists of two components. The
first component
∂piA
∂qB2
= −(gqA1 + qA2) < 0 (2.56)
is always negative. The second component derived from (2.8) is given by
∂q∗B2
∂xB
=
2− β
3
> 0 (2.57)
is always positive. Hence, the within-product coordination effect
∂piA
∂qB2
∂q∗B2
∂xB
= −2− β
3
(gqA1 + qA2) (2.58)
is always negative.
Proof of Lemma 2.3:
As seen in (2.22), the marginal benefit for firm A under cooperation can be de-
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composed into two components, where dpiB/dxA is the additional component under
cooperation. Whether RCA(xB) lies above or below R
N
A (xB) under competition de-
pends only on the sign of this additional component. If the additional component
is positive, then RCA(xB) > R
N
A (xB). When substituting (2.48), (2.51) and (2.54)
into the additional component of (2.22) we obtain (2.24).
It is easy to see that whenever β > 1/2, then dpiB/dxA > 0. Moreover, if
β < 1/2, then dpiB/dxA < 0 and if β = 1/2, then dpiB/dxA = 0. This concludes
the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.4:
In (2.23) the marginal benefit under cooperation for firm B can be decomposed into
two components, where dpiA/dxB is an additional component under cooperation.
Whether RCB(xA) lies above or below R
N
B (xA) under competition depends only on
the sign of the additional component. If the additional component is positive,
then RCB(xA) > R
N
B (xA). When substituting (2.55) and (2.58) into the additional
component of (2.23) we obtain (2.25). It is easy to show that if 0 ≤ β < 1/2 and
any g ≥ 0, then equation (2.25) will be negative.
Next, if g = 0 (as in D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)) and β = 1/2, we
have
dpiA
dxB
= 0. (2.59)
This implies that then RCA(xB) = R
N
A (xB).
If we now keep β = 1/2 and increase g, we have
dpiA
dxB
= −gqA1
2
< 0. (2.60)
This means that for β = 1/2 and every g > 0 the reaction function under coordi-
nation is below the one under competition.
It remains to show what happens if β > 1/2 and g > 0. Expression (2.25) is
positive if
g < gCB(β) ≡
2(2β − 1)qA2
(2− β)qA1 (2.61)
and negative otherwise.
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Given that the quantities qA1 and qA2 depend on the parameter g themselves,
we cannot obtain the closed form for gCB(β). However, when 1/2 < β ≤ 1, it is
2β − 1 > 0 and also qA1 > 0 and qA2 > 0, gCB(β) ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Proposition 2.3:
To compare R&D investment levels under competition and cooperation, we need
to analyze the positions of RCA(xB) and R
C
B(xA) under R&D cooperation compared
to RNA (xB) and R
N
B (xA) under R&D competition.
We observe that all relevant reaction functions, (2.26), (2.27), (2.43) and (2.44),
are linear. Hence, it is convenient to compare R&D investment levels under coop-
eration and cooperation graphically in a xA − xB-diagram.
Case 1: 0 ≤ β < 1/2. According to Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4, both RCi (xj)
under R&D cooperation lie below RNi (xj) , hence R&D investment levels under
cooperation are lower than under competition. Figure 2.3 illustrates the case when
0 < g < g¯N(β). For this parameter range, from Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, we know
that the slopes of Rki (xj) for k ∈ C,N are negative. The cases g¯N(β) < g < g¯C(β)
and g¯C(β) < g < 1 are depicted in Figure 2.7.
xB
xA
RNAR
C
A
RNB
RCB
N
C
xCB
xCA
xNB
xNA
0 < β < 1/2, g¯N(β) < g < g¯C(β)
xB
xA
RCA R
N
A
RCB
RNBC
N
xCB
xCA
xNB
xNA
0 < β < 1/2, g¯C(β) < g < 1
Figure 2.7: Optimal R&D investment levels under competition and cooperation
We conclude that when 0 ≤ β < 1/2 and 0 ≤ g < 1, both firms invest
more under R&D competition than under R&D cooperation, hence xNA > x
C
A and
xNB > x
C
B.
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Case 2: 1/2 ≤ β < 1. When gCB(β) < g < 1, by Lemma 2.3, RCA(xB) >
RNA (xB), while by Lemma 2.4, R
C
B(xA) < R
N
B (xA). According to Lemmas 2.1 and
2.2 the slopes of the reaction functions under both regimes are positive. This
is illustrated in Figure 2.4. The R&D investment level of firm B is lower un-
der cooperation than under competition and the R&D investment level of firm A
could also be lower under cooperation than under competition when the difference
|RCB(xA)−RNB (xA)| is significantly greater than the difference |RCA(xB)−RNA (xB)|.
This scenario happens when β → 1/2 and g 6= 0. There exists a function
gA(β) : [1/2, 1] → (0, 1) with gCB(β) ≤ gCA(β) ≤ 1 such that xNA > xCA, when
g > gCA(β) and x
N
A < x
C
A, when g < g
C
A(β).
xB
xA
RNA ,R
C
A
RCB
RNB
N
C
xCB
xCA
xNB
xNA
β = 1/2, g > 0
xB
xA
RNA R
C
A
RNB
RCB
N
C
xCB
xCA
xNB
xNA
1/2 < β < 1, 0 ≤ g < gBC (β)
Figure 2.8: Optimal R&D investment levels under competition and cooperation
Moreover, when β = 1/2 and g ∈ (0, 1) by Lemma 2.3, RCA(xB) = RNA (xB),
while, by Lemma 2.4, RCB(xA) < R
N
B (xA). This case is depicted in the left diagram
of Figure 2.8. It is easy to see that xNA > x
C
A and x
N
B > x
C
B. Only if g = 0,
both (2.24) and (2.25) are the same as under competition such that xNA = x
C
A and
xNB = x
C
B.
It remains to analyze the case when 0 < g < gCB(β). According to Lemmas 2.3
and 2.4, RCi (xj) of both firms under cooperation lie above those under competition.
According to Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2, the slopes are all positive. This is illustrated in
the right diagram of Figure 2.8. It is easy to see that xNA < x
C
A and x
N
B < x
C
B.
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Proof of Proposition 2.4:
From proposition 2.3, it follows directly that when 0 < β ≤ 1/2 and 0 < g < 1
and when β > 1/2 and gAC(β) < g < 1:
xCA < x
N
A (2.62)
xCB < x
N
B (2.63)
Hence, for these parameter values, xC = xCA + x
C
B < x
N
A + x
N
B = x
N .
Further on, in the area 1/2 < β < 1 and 0 < g < gCB(β) the following holds:
xCA > x
N
A (2.64)
xCB > x
N
B (2.65)
Thus, for these parameter values, xC = xCA + x
C
B > x
N
A + x
N
B = x
N .
In the remaining area, i.e. 1/2 < β < 1 and gCB(β) < g < g
C
A(β), we have
xCA > x
N
A (2.66)
xCB < x
N
B (2.67)
hence, there exists a function gC(β) : [0, 1]→ (0, 1) with gCB(β) ≤ gC(β) ≤ gCA(β),
such that xC > xN , when g > gC(β) and xC < xN , when g < gC(β). We, however,
do a numerical analysis for this special case. See Figure 2.6 for clarification.
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Robustness of strategic mediation
This chapter is based on the joint work with Martin Pollrich.
3.1 Introduction
There are many situations in which decision makers lack relevant information
concerning a decision to make and seek advice from experts who have such in-
formation. For example, before implementing a policy, politicians consult their
advisors; or prior to deciding on a new product, CEOs of big companies ask en-
gineers about technical feasibility to manufacture the product. Such interactions
are often accompanied by a conflict of interest, i.e. given the information, each
party may prefer a different decision to take. Previous literature has addressed the
problem of strategic information transmission along several lines.1 In particular,
it reveals the insight that indirect communication via a mediator (interested2 or
disinterested3) improves upon direct talk. In this chapter, we address the question
as to what extend these results rely on the availability of the mediator.
We thus perform a robustness test where we allow for a possibility of small
perturbation that the mediator is not available. With such a test we want to
check whether such equilibrium is robust to some real-life deviations. For instance,
1See Crawford and Sobel (1982), Board et al. (2007), Goltsman et al. (2009), Ivanov (2010a),
Ambrus et al. (2013), Krishna and Morgan (2004) to name a few.
2See Ivanov (2010a).
3See Myerson (1986), Forges (1986), Goltsman et al. (2009) among othrers.
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whether it is robust in a technological sense, e.g. when the communication device
breaks down, or in a practical sense, i.e. when the mediator is sick. In other words,
we study the practical implementability of mediated equilibrium.
We show that, unless the failure gets too likely, there exist an equilibrium of
this perturbed game, that is outcome equivalent to the one with the mediator.
That is, the equilibrium is robust to the possibility of the mediator being absent.
Our analysis is based on the uniform-quadratic model by Crawford and Sobel
(1982) (CS hereafter). CS study direct communication and show that the full
revelation of information is impossible when the interests of the sender and receiver
are not totally aligned. However, when the preferences of the expert and the
decision maker are not too far apart, some information transmission can occur.
Ivanov (2010a) adds a biased mediator into CS model, i.e. a strategic player that
is interested in influencing the receiver’s decision. He shows that when the sender
and the mediator have opposing biases, the mediated communication between
sender and receiver can be more informative than the direct talk. In their model,
the expert is committed to talking to the receiver in one specific way. Namely, the
sender first learns the state of the world, then sends a message to the mediator,
the mediator, consequently, gives a recommendation to the receiver. A natural
question arises: can we obtain such outcome even when the expert can decide on
the mode of communication (to talk the receiver either directly or via a mediator)
or when the mediator is not present.
To address that question, we consider the following modification of mediated
communication. With some probability  ∈ [0, 1) the mediator is not available
for communication. In this case, the sender can only send a message directly to
the receiver. Otherwise, if the mediator is available, the sender can either send
a signal to the mediator or send a message directly to the receiver. The receiver
only observes the message and channel from which the message comes, but does
not know which channel is available.
We first argue that when both channels are available ( = 0) it is always
possible to implement the most informative outcome of either of the two channels.
Such an equilibrium replicates the equilibrium if only the respective channel was
available for communication. Additionally, it adds beliefs on the off-equilibrium
path for any message that is sent through the other channel in a specific way: these
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beliefs should be consistent with the receiver taking an action which the sender
can ensure by sending some message through the intended channel.
When the probability of mediator being absent is positive but not too high, it
is still possible to implement the most informative mediated outcome. In one such
equilibrium, on the direct channel, every sender type sends the same message and
the receiver interprets it as babbling. When the mediator is present, the lowest
sender’s types randomize between sending a message directly to the receiver or
sending a signal to the mediator. The rest of the equilibrium path on the mediated
channel is equivalent to the equilibrium in Ivanov (2010a).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives the
preview of the related literature. Section 3.3 presents the theoretical model and
the equilibrium concept. In Section 3.4 we review the direct communication as
studied by CS and also the mediated communication studied by Goltsman et al.
(2009) and Ivanov (2010a). Section 3.5 presents our main result. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Related literature
The seminal work on cheap talk is by Crawford and Sobel (1982). CS study
strategic communication between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver.
The sender can send a single message only. CS show that communication is not
fully informative, as long as sender’s and receiver’s preferences are not fully aligned,
and characterize the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria of the communication game.
While CS restrict communication to a single round of message exchange from
sender to receiver, Krishna and Morgan (2004) allow for multiple rounds of bilateral
message exchange. In their model, the receiver thus has an active role. They use
the uniform-quadratic framework of the CS-model and show that such multi-stage
communication typically improves upon one stage communication, both in terms
of revealed information and players’ payoffs.
Board et al. (2007) consider noisy communication in the spirit of Rubinstein
(1989) and Myerson (1991). One could think of their communication as a talk
through a mechanical device that with some probability passes on an unchanged
message from the sender to the receiver, and with the remaining probability it sends
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a random message. They show that adding a proper amount of technological noise
to the communication may improve the informativeness of the talk in comparison
to the CS model.
Goltsman et al. (2009) study mediation in the uniform-quadratic framework of
the CS-model. They determine the highest ex-ante expected payoff that can be
reached by the receiver (and sender) and show that the threshold is achieved by
the specific noise structure analyzed by Board et al. (2007). The communication
structure by Krishna and Morgan (2004) also attain the highest expected payoff
to the receiver, however only when the conflict of interest between the sender and
receiver is much smaller.
Ivanov (2010a) introduce a strategic mediator that can have its own agenda,
i.e. it has its own preference. He also considers the uniform-quadratic framework
of the CS-model and shows that the mechanical mediator studied by Goltsman
et al. (2009) can be replaced by a strategic player who has similar preferences as
the sender and receiver but must have a specific bias (in relation to sender’s bias).
The fact that the mediation can improve communication was shown much
earlier. Forges (1986) and Myerson (1986) studied general communication devices
or impartial mediators. In their models, all players have private information. The
mediator collects reports from all players and then calculates recommended action
for each player based on these reports. In CS setup, however, only one player has
private information and sends a message to the uninformed player who then takes
an action.
In all aforementioned extensions of the model by CS, there is a commitment
to the specific channel of communication. That is, it is implicitly assumed that
all communication between the sender and the receiver can only pass through
this channel and, for instance, the sender cannot bypass the channel and send a
message directly to the receiver. In this article, we weaken this assumption.
This article also contributes to the literature on cheap talk in organizations.
Dessein (2002), Ivanov (2010b), Alonso et al. (2008), and McGee and Yang (2013)
investigate when is delegation of authority to the informed expert preferred to
centralized decision-making. Dessein (2002) and Ivanov (2010b) consider a situa-
tion with a single sender, while Alonso et al. (2008) and McGee and Yang (2013)
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allow for multiple senders4 where the senders communicate with the receiver via
cheap talk. Delegation due to informational asymmetries is also studied by Alonso
and Matouschek (2007) where they considered an infinitely repeated game with a
long-lived principal and a many of short-lived agents. Similar to these papers, we
also study the practical implementations of achieved equilibria.
3.3 Model
3.3.1 Setup
We study the uniform-quadratic specification of the CS model of strategic com-
munication. There are two players, sender and receiver. The sender, called S,
privately observes the state of nature θ ∈ [0, 1]. The receiver, called R, takes
an action a ∈ R. The payoffs of both players depend on the sender’s private
information θ and the receiver’s action a. Specifically,
US(a, θ, b) = −(a− (θ + b))2 (3.1)
UR(a, θ) = −(a− θ)2 (3.2)
where b > 0 denotes the sender’s bias. Intuitively, R’s optimal action conditional
on the state θ is aR(θ) = θ, i.e. R seeks to match the state. On the other hand,
S’s optimal action is aS(θ) = θ + b.
3.3.2 Mediated talk
Building on the insights obtained by CS, several authors studied alternative modes
of communication5. This chapter focuses on mediation as one such channel. The
sender first reports her type to the mediator and the mediator then gives a recom-
mendation to the receiver about what action to take. Subsequently, the receiver
chooses an action.
4Cheap talk with multiple senders was also studied by Krishna and Morgan (2001), Ambrus
and Takahashi (2008), Battaglini (2002), Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Austen-Smith (1993),
Levy and Razin (2007), among others.
5See for example, Board et al. (2007), Ivanov (2010a), Krishna and Morgan (2004), Ambrus
et al. (2013).
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To find an optimal mediation scheme for the uniform-quadratic case, Goltsman
et al. (2009) maximize the ex-ante expected utility of the receiver. It is sufficient
to rank the equilibria from the receiver’s point of view because VS = VR−b2, where
VR is receiver’s and VS sender’s ex-ante expected utility.
Goltsman et al. (2009) determine an upper bound of the receiver’s expected
utility for the case of a mechanical mediator. Ivanov (2010a) examines a mediator
that is a strategic actor, i.e. it has its own utility,
UM(a, θ, β) = −(a− (θ + β))2 (3.3)
where β ∈ R is the bias of the mediator. Ivanov (2010a) shows that for some
specific β the same upper bound can be reached by strategic mediator.
3.3.3 Imperfect mediation
This chapter addresses the practical implementability of Ivanov’s finding. Consider
the following alteration of mediated communication. With probability  ∈ [0, 1)
the mediator is not available. Non-availability may be for technical reasons—e.g.
failure of electronic devices—or for other reasons—e.g. sickness of the mediator.
In this case, the sender is forced to send a message m ∈M directly to the receiver.
Otherwise, if the mediator is available, the sender can either send a signal to the
mediator or send a message directly to the receiver. The receiver does not know
which channel is available, but only from which channel does the message come.
The timing of this game is the following, nature first decides whether the
strategic mediator is available for the communication and then chooses sender’s
type. The sender then privately observes the value of θ. If the mediator is not
present, the sender can only send message m0 ∈M0 directly to the receiver, where
M0 is a message space available for the direct talk. However, if the mediator is
available, the sender decides on sending a message m0 directly to the receiver or
a signal s ∈ S to the mediator. The mediator, if received the signal, makes a
recommendation m1 ∈M1 to the receiver. Upon receiving m0 or m1, the receiver
chooses an action a.
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3.3.4 Equilibrium
We next characterize strategies for all three players in game Γ. Sender’s strategy
is a vector ρ = (ρ0, ρ1) with ρ0 : Θ −→ M0 and ρ1 : Θ −→ M0 × S specifying for
each θ a probability distribution on the sets of messages and signals. A mediator’s
strategy is a mapping σ : S −→ ∆(M1), specifying for any received signal a
distribution over the set of messages M1. Finally, the receiver’s strategy is a
vector a = (a0(m0), a1(m1)) with ai : M i −→ R, i ∈ {0, 1}, where ai(mi) is an
action taken by the receiver after receiving message mi.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game Γ consists of a signaling strategy
for the expert ρ = (ρ0(m0|θ), ρ1(m0, s|θ)), a messaging strategy for the mediator
σ(m1|s), an action rule for the receiver a = (a0(m0), a1(m1)), a belief function
for the mediator F (θ|s), which assigns probability distributions over states θ for
every s, and a belief functions of the receiver G(θ|m0) and G(θ|m1), which assign
probability distributions over states θ to m0 and m1 respectively.
To form an equilibrium, it is required, that for any message m0 or m1, the
receiver maximizes his expected utility given his beliefs G(θ|m0) and G(θ|m1).
Also, for any signal s, the mediator maximizes her expected utility given her
belief F (θ|s) and a(m1). The expert maximizes her expected utility given σ(m1|s)
and a = (a0(m0), a1(m1)). Finally, any F (θ|s) and G(θ|m1) are derived from
ρ = (ρ0, ρ1) and σ(m
1|s) using Bayes’ rule wherever possible.
3.4 Review of existing results
To study game Γ that consists of direct and mediated channel, we first recall
the relevant existing results on direct and mediated communication. We start
with the seminal work by Crawford and Sobel (1982) on cheap talk with one
round of face-to-face communication which is followed by Goltsman et al. (2009)
on communication via an impartial mediator. In the end, we discuss results by
Ivanov (2010a) on communication via a strategic mediator.
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3.4.1 One round face-to-face communication
CS analyze a game similar to ours, only that there is no third party involved.
Formally, the sender S first privately observes the state θ and then sends a single
message m ∈M to the receiver, where M is some message space. After observing
m, but not the state θ, the receiver R takes an action a ∈ R.
The equilibrium notion for this game called ΓD, are the following, sender’s
strategy is a mapping ρD : Θ −→ MD and a receiver’s strategy is a mapping
aD : MD −→ R. The belief function of the receiver is GD(θ|mD). For the uniform-
quadratic specification of utilities, their results can be summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.1 (Crawford and Sobel (1982)) For every b > 0, there exists
an integer6 ND(b) =
⌈−1/2+1/2(1+2/b)1/2⌉ such that, for every N with 1 ≤ N ≤
ND(b), there exists exactly one equilibrium of game ΓD with N induced actions
and there is no equilibrium which induces more than ND(b) actions. Equilibria are
described by a partition (θD0 , ..., θ
D
N), such that
0 = θD0 < θ
D
1 < ... < θ
D
N = 1 (3.4)
θDi =
i
N
+ 2bi(i−N) , i ∈ {0, ..., N} (3.5)
aDi =
θDi−1 + θ
D
i
2
. (3.6)
Proof of Proposition 3.1: See Crawford and Sobel (1982).
The sender’s type space is partitioned into N intervals and each induced action
is associated with one interval. That is, for every i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, all types from
interval [θDi−1, θ
D
i ] pool together and send the same message. The receiver’s best
response is than simply the average of the types from the relevant interval, as
given by (3.6). Additionally, a type between two adjacent intervals [θDi−1, θ
D
i ] and
[θDi , θ
D
i+1] is indifferent between inducing actions a
D
i and a
D
i+1.
As a consequence of Proposition 3.1, already for b > 1/4, the only equilibrium
of game ΓD is the babbling equilibrium. That is, every sender type sends the same
signal which is thus uninformative and the receiver takes the uninformed action
6dxe is the smallest integer greater than or equal to x.
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Figure 3.1: Most informative equilibria with one-round of face-to-face communication
for large bias, b = 1/3 (left panel), and intermediate bias, b = 1/10 (right panel).
a = 1/2. Only for small biases, b < 1/4, there exist equilibria in which the sender
reveals some information to the receiver.
The partitioning equilibira established above yield the following comparative
statics. For any given bias b > 0, equilibria that partition the sender’s type space
into finer intervals yield higher ex-ante expected utility for both the sender and
the receiver. In particular, among the partitioning equilibria for a particular bias
b > 0, the one with ND(b) partitioning elements Pareto dominates all others. The
maximum number of induced actions, ND(b), is decreasing in b, i.e. the lower
the conflict of interest, the more information can be revealed in equilibrium. To
illustrate this, we consider the following simple examples and present them in
Figure 3.1.
Example 3.1 Consider the sender’s bias b = 1/3. The maximum number of par-
titions is ND(1/3) = 1, thus the only equilibrium is babbling, i.e. no information
is revealed. The receiver’s optimal action is thus aD1 = 1/2.
Example 3.2 Consider the sender’s bias b = 1/10. The maximum number of
partitions is ND(1/10) = 2 and the 2-step equilibrium involves a cut-off type θD1 =
3/10 and induced actions aD1 = 3/20 and a
D
2 = 13/20.
3.4.2 Mediated communication
In principle, sender and receiver can follow more sophisticated communication
protocols, such as multiple rounds of message exchange, communication via third
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parties, via noisy channels, etc. A convenient short-cut for analyzing such com-
plex communication structures lies in applying the revelation principle. Invoking
the latter yields the following tractable structure. The sender first reports her
type to the mediator. Next, the mediator recommends the receiver an action to
take. Finally, the receiver takes an action, which may differ from the mediator’s
recommendation. The revelation principle further implies that the analysis can
be restricted to equlibria where the sender reports her type truthfully and the
receiver follows the mediator’s recommendation. This structure has been analyzed
by Goltsman et al. (2009). The following proposition summarizes their results.
Proposition 3.2 (Goltsman et al. (2009)) For every 0 < b < 1/2:
a) The upper bound of the receiver’s ex-ante expected utility is
V¯R(b) = −b(1− b)/3.
b) The following partitioning equilibrium reaches this bound: For every θM ∈
[θMi , θ
M
i+1], i ∈ {0, ..., NM − 1}, the mediator recommends action b with prob-
ability µ and action ai+1 with probability 1− µ, where
θM0 = 0 (3.7)
θMi = 2bi
2 − (2b(NM)2 − 1) 2i− 1
2NM − 1 , i ∈ {1, ..., N
M} (3.8)
aMi = b(i+ 1)− 2bi(NM − i) +
(2− b)i
2NM − 1 (3.9)
µ = 1− 1− 2b
4(1− b)
( 1
NM − 1 −
1
NM
− 2− b
bNM − 1 +
2− b
bNM − b+ 1
)
. (3.10)
with NM =
⌈
1/
√
2b
⌉
.
Proof of Proposition 3.2: See Goltsman et al. (2009).
Goltsman et al. (2009) derive an upper bound on the receiver’s payoff, depend-
ing on the bias. This bound is reached when the lowest sender’s type θ = 0 gets
its preferred action b.7 They further give an explicit equilibrium that achieves this
upper bound. The equilibrium construction is taken from results in Board et al.
7The payoff of the sender of type 0 in the proposed equilibrium is U(b, 0, b) = 0.
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Figure 3.2: Most informative equilibria with mediated communication for large bias,
b = 1/3 (left panel), and intermediate bias, b = 1/10 (right panel).
(2007) on noisy talk, where the sender sends messages to the receiver, but these
messages may get lost with probability µ.
In order to compare this equilibrium with the one achieved by the one-round
face-to-face communication, we consider examples with the same biases as in Sec-
tion 3.4.1.
Example 3.1 (continued) Consider the sender’s bias b = 1/3. The maximum
number of partitions is NM(1/10) = 2 and the 2-step equilibrium involves a cut-off
type θM1 = 1/9 with induced actions a
M
1 = 1/3 and a
M
2 = 5/9. If the sender reports
type θ < 1/9, the mediator always recommends aM1 . If the sender reports type
θ > 1/9 he recommends aM1 with probability µ = 5/32 and a
M
2 otherwise.
Example 3.2 (continued) Consider the sender’s bias b = 1/10. The maximum
number of partitions is NM(1/10) = 3 and the 3-step equilibrium involves cut-off
types θM1 = 1/25 and θ
M
2 = 8/25 with induced actions a
M
1 = 1/10, a
M
2 = 9/50 and
aM3 = 33/50. If the sender reports type θ < 1/25, the mediator always recommends
aM1 . If 1/25 < θ < 8/25, the mediator recommends a
M
1 with probability µ = 5/32
and aM2 otherwise. Similarly, if 8/25 < θ < 1, the mediator recommends a
M
1 with
probability µ = 5/32 and aM3 otherwise.
The equilibria from the previous examples are illustrated in Figure 3.2.
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In contrast to the CS, where the sender reveals some information only for
b < 1/4, the equilibrium described in Proposition 3.2 is informative already for
b < 1/2. Additionally, for almost all biases the mediated talk is more informative
and generates higher payoff.
3.4.3 Communication via a strategic mediator
The results established in Goltsman et al. (2009) rely on a mechanical mediator.
This mediator is assumed to be impartial and trustworthy. In particular, the me-
diator should not have its own agenda. That is, it should not have its own interest
in the receiver’s action. Ivanov (2010a) studies the case where the mediator has
a preference over the receiver’s actions and is thus not impartial. The mediator’s
utility function is given in (3.3).
A talk via a strategic mediator proceeds as follows. First S privately observes
the state θ and sends a signal s ∈ SS to the mediator. The mediator privately
observes signal sS and sends message mS ∈ MS to R. R observes mS and takes
action aS.
The sender’s strategy is a mapping ρS : Θ −→ S, the mediator’s strategy is a
mapping σS : S −→ ∆(MS) and the receiver’s strategy is a mapping aS : M −→ R.
The belief functions for the mediator and the receiver are the following F S(θ|sS)
and GS(θ|mS). We call this game ΓS.
Ivanov (2010a) shows that the highest payoff identified in Goltsman et al. (2009)
can also be achieved with a strategic mediator, as long as the mediator’s bias is
appropriately chosen. An equilibrium characterized in the following proposition
reaches this bound.
Proposition 3.3 (Ivanov (2010a)) For every b > 0, there exists β ∈ [−2b, 0]
such that game ΓS has a partitioning equilibrium with NS(b) = b1/√2bc induced
actions. For every θS ∈ [θS1 , θS2 ], the mediator recommends action aS2 with proba-
bility σ, and action b with probability 1− σ, moreover
θS0 = 0 (3.11)
θS1 =
1
3
(2b((NS − 2)2 − 1)− 23/2b1/2(NS − 2) + 1) (3.12)
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θS2 = 3θ
S
1 + 2b (3.13)
θSi = θ
S
2 + (i− 2)(2bi+
1
NS − 2(1− θ2 − 2b(N
S − 2)(NS − 3))− 6b), 3 ≤ i ≤ NS
(3.14)
aS1 = b, a
S
i =
θSi−1 + θ
S
i
2
, i = 2, ..., NS (3.15)
σS =
3
8
3θS1 + 2b
θS1 + b
(3.16)
Proof of Proposition 3.3: See Ivanov (2010a).
The optimal mediator’s bias has a negative sign, hence it counterbalances the
positive bias of the sender. That is, the sender always tends to overstate the infor-
mation, while the mediator tries to understate it. Such mediator, when receiving a
signal from the second lowest interval, randomizes between the two lowest actions.
When the mediator gets a signal from any other interval, it simply recommends
the corresponding action.
In order to compare this equilibrium with the one presented in Proposition 3.2,
we consider examples with the same biases as in Section 3.4.2.
Example 3.1 (continued) Consider the sender’s bias b = 1/3. The maximum
number of partitions is NS(1/3) = 2 and the 2-step equilibrium involves a cut-off
type θS1 = 1/9 and induced actions a
S
1 = 1/3 and a
S
2 = 5/9. If the sender reports
type θ < 1/9, the mediator always recommends aS1 . If the sender reports θ > 1/9,
the mediator recommends aS1 with probability σ = 5/32 and a
S
2 otherwise.
Example 3.2 (continued) Consider the sender’s bias b = 1/10. The maximum
number of partitions is NS(1/10) = 3 and the 3-step equilibrium involves cut-off
types θS1 = 0.035 and θ
S
2 = 0.3 with induced actions a
S
1 = 0.1, a
S
2 = 0.17 and
aS3 = 0.65. If the sender reports type θ < 0.035, the mediator always recommends
aM1 and if the sender reports type θ > 0.3, the mediator always recommends a
M
3 .
If 0.035 < θ < 0.3, the mediator recommends aM1 with probability σ = 0.15 and a
M
2
otherwise.
Figure 3.3 illustrates those two equilibria.
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Figure 3.3: Most informative equilibria with communication via a strategic mediator for
b = 1/3 (left panel) and b = 1/10 (right panel).
The equilibrium constructions of the communication via an impartial mediator
and via the strategic one are very similar. In both, low types are sometimes mixed
up with the higher types. However, the impartial mediator randomizes in each
state, while the strategic mediator mixes only when receiving a signal from the
second lowest interval.
3.5 Robustness of strategic mediation
After recalling the equilibrium characterizations of the direct talk and the talk via
a strategic mediator, we now analyze game Γ. The equilibrium notion of game Γ is
given in Section 3.3.4. In this game with probability  ∈ [0, 1) the mediator is not
available for communication. In this case, the sender is forced to communicate to
the receiver directly. Otherwise, if the mediator is available, the sender can either
send a signal to the mediator or send a message directly to the receiver. When
receiving a message directly from the sender, the receiver does not know whether
it is because the mediator is not present or because the sender simply decided to
approach receiver directly.
We first consider a case when the probability of the mediator being absent is
equal to zero, hence, both channels are available. The sender can, thus, choose
whether to talk directly or indirectly to the receiver.
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Lemma 3.1 When  = 0, for any equilibrium outcome of game ΓD or ΓS, there
is an equilibrium of game Γ which achieves the same outcome.
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Consider the following equilibrium outcome of game Γi,
i ∈ {D,S}: (θi0, θi1, ..., θiN i+1) is the equilibrium partition of the sender’s type space
and ai1, ..., a
i
N i are the induced actions.
Let a¯i be an action induced with certainty by some sender’s report θi ∈
[θik−1, θ
i
k], k ∈ {1, ..., N i}.8 An equilibrium of game Γ achieves the same out-
come as some equilibrium of game Γi if the receiver after observing message mjn,
j ∈ {D,S},  6= i, n ∈ {1, ..., N j}, believes that the true state lays in the interval
[θik−1, θ
i
k]. Hence, the receiver after receiving message m
j
n, takes an action a¯
i.
The equilibrium partition of game Γ on direct channel is:
θ0n = θ
D
n , n ∈ {0, ..., N0}, N0 = ND (3.17)
and on the mediated channel:
θ1m = θ
S
m,m ∈ {0, ..., N1}, N1 = NS (3.18)
For i = D, the actions induced in equilibrium are
a0n = a
D
n , n ∈ {0, ..., N0}, N0 = ND (3.19)
a1m = a¯
D,m ∈ {0, ..., N1}, N1 = NS (3.20)
Otherwise, for i = S, the equilibrium actions are
a0n = a¯
S, n ∈ {0, ..., N0}, N0 = ND (3.21)
a1m = a
S
m,m ∈ {0, ..., N1}, N1 = NS (3.22)
σ = σS (3.23)
where σ is the probability that the mediator recommends action a12 and with the
remaining probability the action a11.
The previous lemma shows that when both channels are available, there is an
equilibrium of game Γ that replicates either of the equilibria of games ΓD or ΓS.
8All actions in game ΓD and all but aS2 in game Γ
S are induced with certainty.
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For example, in order to attain the equilibrium outcome of game ΓS (ΓD), when
the receiver gets a message from the direct (mediated) channel he takes an action
which the sender can ensure by sending a message through the mediated (direct)
channel. The off-equilibrium beliefs are consistent with such receiver’s strategy.
This makes perfect sense from a purely theoretical perspective, as the perfect
Bayesian equilibrium places no restrictions on the receiver’s beliefs at the off-
equilibrium path, hence we can set all out-off-equilibrium beliefs equal to some
equilibrium beliefs. However, it is hard to imagine that the decision maker would
completely ignore suggestions from either of the two channels. Yet, the existing
criteria for the equilibrium selection are not applicable in this case9.
We next assume that the probability of mediator being absent is positive,  > 0.
The receiver does not know which channel is available, but only from which channel
does the message come from. In this case, the receiver cannot ignore the messages
coming from the unexpected channel.
Proposition 3.4 If 0 <  < ¯, game Γ has an equilibrium that satisfies VR =
V¯R(b).
10
Proof of Proposition 3.4: Consider the following strategy profile:
θ00 = 0, θ
0
1 = 1 (3.24)
θ1i = θ
S
i , i ∈ {0, ..., N1}, N1 = NS (3.25)
a01 = a
1
1 = b (3.26)
a1i =
θ1i−1 + θ
1
i
2
, i ∈ {2, ..., N − 1} (3.27)
9The standard refinement concepts for signaling games (e.g. the intuitive criterion by Cho
and Kreps (1987) and divinity criterion by Banks and Sobel (1987)) have no selection power
for cheap-talk games. The refinement concepts specially designed for cheap-talk games, like
neologism-proofness by Farrell (1993), announcement proofness by Matthews et al. (1991) or
credible message rationalizability by Rabin (1990), can select most informative equilibria in
some classes of cheap-talk games, they are however not applicable under CS uniform-quadratic
framework. Chen et al. (2008) propose the NITS condition that uniquely selects the most infor-
mative equilibrium of the uniform-quadratic CS model. Even though NITS works well for the
CS direct talk, it cannot be applied to mediated communication.
10Where ¯ = (2
√
2b(N1−2)−1−2b(N1−4)N1)(1−2√2b(N1−2)+2b(3−4N1+(N1)2))/4(2+√
2b(N1− 2) + b(12N1− 3(N1)2− 14)− b2N1(19N1− 8(N1)2 + (N1)3− 12) +√2b3/2(2(N1)3−
12(N1)2 + 19(N1)− 6)) with N1 = NS .
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α =
(2b− θ11)θ11 − (1− 2b+ θ11)(1− θ11)
(1− )(2b− θ11)θ11
(3.28)
σ =
(1− 2b)
8(1− )θ11(θ11 + b)
+
3(3θ11 + 2b)
8(θ11 + b)
(3.29)
When θ ∈ [θ11, θ12], the mediator recommends action a11 with probability σ, and
action a12 with probability 1− σ. Also, when the mediator is available, the sender
sends a message directly to the receiver with probability α, otherwise with proba-
bility 1− α, he reports his type to the mediator.
The only action that can be obtained on the direct channel is a01 = b. That
action is equivalent to the lowest action that can be achieved on the mediated
channel a11 = b. Therefore, when the mediator is available, the sender’s types from
the lowest interval [0, θ11] are indifferent between taking directly or indirectly to
the receiver, as they always get action b.
When the mediator is not available all sender types send message m01, otherwise
(when the mediator is available) only low types, θ ∈ [0, θ11], send message m01, hence
the receiver’s best response is:
a01 =
1
2
+ (1− )θ11α 12θ11
+ (1− )θ11α
(3.30)
Plugging a01 = b into (3.30) and solving for α, results in:
α =
(2b− θ11)θ11 − (1− 2b+ θ11)(1− θ11)
(1− )(2b− θ11)θ11
(3.31)
given that b, , θ11 ∈ (0, 1), it follows that α ∈ (0, 1).
When the mediator is available, the action a11 is induced by the two lowest
sender’s partitions. The receiver’s best response is
a11 =
θ11(1− α)12θ11 + (1− σ)(θ12 − θ11)12(θ12 + θ11)
θ11(1− α) + (1− σ)(θ12 − θ11)
(3.32)
Plugging a11 = b into (3.32) and solving for σ results in :
σ =
(1− 2b)
8(1− )θ11(θ11 + b)
+
3(3θ11 + 2b)
8(θ11 + b)
(3.33)
and σ ∈ (0, 1), whenever  < ¯ = (2√2b(N1−2)−1−2b(N1−4)N1)(1−2√2b(N1−
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Figure 3.4: Most informative equilibrium of game Γ for b = 1/3 and  = 1/9
2)+2b(3−4N1+(N1)2))/4(2+√2b(N1−2)+b(12N1−3(N1)2−14)−b2N1(19N1−
8(N1)2 + (N1)3 − 12) +√2b3/2(2(N1)3 − 12(N1)2 + 19(N1)− 6)) ∈ (0, 1).
The remaining strategies are identical to the equilibrium strategies in game ΓS
and according to Proposition 3.3 they constitute the equilibrium.
Goltsman et al. (2009) show that the upper bound for the receiver’s ex-ante
expected payoff (V¯R(b)) is achieved if and only if the sender’s expected payoff
of the lowest type θ = 0 is 0. Given that a01 = a
1
1 = b, we have US(a, θ, b) =
US(a
0
1, θ, b) + (1− )US(a11, θ, b) = 0. This concludes the proof.
The previous proposition shows that when the probability of the mediator
being absent is not too high, the optimal mediated outcome is achievable. In such
an equilibrium, the receiver puts some reasonable beliefs on the messages coming
directly from the sender.
The construction of the equilibrium is as follows. When the mediator is not
available everyone sends message m01. The receiver then implements action a
0
1 = b.
On the other hand, when the mediator is present, types from the lowest sender’s
partition implement action a11 = b. Hence, those lowest sender’s types are indiffer-
ent between talking directly or indirectly to the receiver and they mix over those
two channels. The mediator when receiving the signal from the second lowest
partition of the sender’s type space, randomizes between recommending action a11
and a12. After receiving signals from other sender’s types, it simply recommends
the corresponding action. Hence, the equilibrium path on the mediated channel is
equivalent to equilibrium in Proposition 3.3.
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Therefore, Ivanov’s strategic mediator is robust to the possibility of direct talk
and also to a small perturbation that the mediator is not present.
Example 3.1 (continued) Consider the sender’s bias b = 1/3 and the proba-
bility of mediator being absent  = 1/9. The maximum number of partitions on
the mediated channel is N1(1/3) = 2 and the sender’s partition of the type space
on the mediated channel involves a cut-off type θ11 = 1/9. There are two induced
actions a11 = 1/3 and a
1
2 = 5/9 on the mediated channel, while we have only one
action, a01 = 1/3 on the direct channel. When the mediator is available, the low-
est sender’s types randomize between a01 and a
1
1 with probabilities α = 13/40 and
1−α = 27/40. If the sender reports type θ < 1/9 to the mediator, the mediator al-
ways recommends a11. If the sender reports type θ > 1/9, the mediator recommends
a11 with probability σ = 0.004 and a
1
2 otherwise. This equilibrium is illustrated in
Figure 3.4.
Example 3.2 (continued) Consider the sender’s bias b = 1/10 and the proba-
bility of mediator being absent  = 7/1000. The maximum number of partitions on
the mediated channel is N1(1/3) = 3 and the sender’s partition of the type space
on the mediated channel involves cut-off types θ11 = 0.035 and θ
1
2 = 0.3. There are
three induced actions a11 = 0.1, a
1
2 = 0.17 and a
1
3 = 0.65 on the mediated chan-
nel, while we have only one action, a01 = 0.1, on the direct channel. When the
mediator is available, the lowest sender’s types randomize between a01 and a
1
1 with
probabilities α = 0.03 and 1−α = 0.97. If the sender reports type θ < 0.035 to the
mediator, the mediator always recommends a11 and if the sender reports θ > 0.3,
the mediator always recommends a13. If 0.035 < θ < 0.3, the mediator recommends
a11 with probability σ = 0.99 and a
1
2 otherwise. This equilibrium is illustrated in
Figure 3.5.
It is easy to see that the equilibrium outcomes of this game and a game where
all conversion has to go through the strategic mediator (ΓS) are identical. However,
in game Γ, the mediator, when receiving a signal from the second lowest interval,
recommends action a11 with a lower probability then the mediator in game Γ
S.
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Figure 3.5: Most informative equilibrium of game Γ for b = 1/10 and  = 7/1000
3.6 Conclusion
In the standard cheap-talk models with a mediator, it is usually assumed that all
communication goes through one specific channel, either through a neutral media-
tor, or through a strategic one, or through a chain of mediators, etc. The situations
when the sender simply wants to talk directly to the receiver and hence bypass the
mediator or when the mediator is not available for communication are ignored. In
this chapter, we address the question as to what extent such alternations affect
the mediated equilibria. We assume that with some probability the mediator is
not available for communication, hence in this case the communication has to go
through the direct channel. We thus perform a robustness test on the mediated
equilibrium, but rather than perturbing strategies, we perturb the game itself. We
show that when the probability of absence is not too large, there exist an equi-
librium of this perturbed game, that is outcome equivalent to the one with the
biased mediator. Hence, the equilibrium designed by Ivanov (2010a) is robust to
the small perturbation that the mediator is not present.
The same logic can be applied for the mechanical mediator given that the most
informative equilibrium of Ivanov (2010a) can be implemented with an impartial
mediator.
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